The merger between two financial institutions. by Lumka, Stewart.
Topic:
Purpose:
The merger between two financial institutions
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of MASTERS IN BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION to the Graduate School of Business,
Faculty of Management, University of Natal (Durban), by
Stewart Lumka.
Supervisor: Professor Elza Thomson
Due Date: 15 September 2003
ii
CONFIDENTIALlTY
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
RE: CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE
Due to the strategic importance of this research it would be appreciated if the






This research has not been previously accepted for any degree and is not being
currently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed... ...~ .
Date: 15 September 2003
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A thesis of this nature cannot be completed without the help and support of many
others. I would like to thank the following people and institutions for their
contributions towards this work:
~ My supervisor, Professor Elza Thomson, for the guidance and assistance in
the completion of the study.
~ My personal assistant, Beverley Omar, for the typing undertaken, document
set up, preparation and sub-editing.
~ Gareth Edwards for information and technological support.
~ Roopanand Lala for printing and binding the final document.




In this investigation, I assessed the underlying reasons for the revolution that
succeeded a conventional merger proposal, which then degenerated into a
hostile takeover bid. To my astonishment, I discovered that both banks were not
diametrically opposed to an amalgamation. In fact, they both agreed on the
strategic importance and business wisdom thereof. The fundamental differences
arose from Standard's perception of Nedcor's deep-rooted arrogant intents,
which were to gain its assets at bargain basement prices. These views were
extended to Nedcor's principal Old Mutual as well, who were accused of
harbouring sinister beliefs to actualise the obsessions of Nedcor's CEO, who
sought to preside over the largest bank in the country, if not in the sub-continent.
In the final analysis, a significant fortune and precious time were wasted in
waging and defending a fruitless effort. This culminated in enriching the
consultants and professional advisors, at the expense of both Standard and
Nedcor shareholders, and their legitimate stakeholders alike.
Conversely, it has since been acknowledged that this case study was a classical
illustration of the potential pitfalls of hostile mergers and acquisitions. These
lessons will undoubtedly enlighten other institutions and industry sectors that may
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.1 Purpose statement
The purpose of this research is to examine the causes of what resembled a
classical textbook merger as proposed by the Nedcor Banking Group
(Nedcor), which sought to combine its entire banking business with that of the
Standard Banking Group (Standard). Instead, this seemingly innocent
cooperative interrelationship degenerated into a strategically offensive
takeover bid.
On 15 November 1999, Nedcor announced a proposed merger offer of one
Nedcor share for 5,5 Standard bank shares. By this time, there was a
foregone conclusion within the financial sector that Standard was going to be
acquired by Nedcor. This view was reinforced by prevailing analytical
research, which originated from the investment analyst community, and from
other highly regarded financial quarters.
1.2 Background
During this period, Standard was generally regarded as a lethargic colossal,
with a management team that had lost touch with the mission of its legitimate
stakeholders and customers alike. Their perceived laissez faire management
style thus rendered Standard a sitting duck for a friendly or hostile take over
bid. Nedcor then seized this opportunity, and was confident of their
competitive advantage. Their offensive was aimed at taking over a larger but
mortally wounded and equally vulnerable competitor. It was also alleged that
Standard was ill equipped to compete on the industry's future battleground,
and was invariably poised to rapidly lose market share. In Nedcor's view,
Standard had exhibited all the negative signals of a vulnerable competitor in
2
distress with a weak competitive strategy. Standard's cost to income ratio was
regarded as comparatively higher than the industry norm, and that they were
committed to aging technology, which further compromised Standard's value
chain and competitive capacity.
In addition, Standard was pre-occupied with global growth strategies to the
detriment of its continental and local operations, resulting in declining profits.
Nedcor suggested therefore that they were motivated by commercial needs to
preserve the long-term financial stability and soundness of the sector, and not
by sector domination as suspected. Whilst Standard was caught napping by
the proposed merger, this shock gave it a deserved early warning of things to
come if they remained in this slumber.
1.2.1 Nedcor's proposed merger benefits
Nedcor's proposed merger or acquisition was presented as potentially
capable of strengthening their market position, and could possibly open new
commercial opportunities for competitive advantage. Therefore, combining its
banking operations with those of Standard could also close identified Nedcor
resource gaps, allowing the merged entity to undertake projects which the
prior independent companies could not even contemplate. Furthermore, the
merged entity would have stronger technology, more or better competitive
capabilities, a more attractive product portfolio, wider market segment
coverage, and greater financial resources. Nedcor also asserted that,
combining these operations offered considerable cost-saving opportunities to
transform an otherwise high cost to income Standard, into a competitor with
average or below average costs. These competitive benefits would be




Nedcor viewed this proposed amalgamation as a friendly merger, which
accordingly made significant business sense. They opined that the merger
would contribute to the realisation of related diversification and strategic fit,
and that these combined value chains will also produce the desired cross
pollination of competitive best practices, cost reductions, valuable resource
strengths and competencies, and equally, the possibility of competing on a
stronger corporate identity.
Furthermore, the prevalence of securitisation, bancassurance1 relationsh ips,
debt and equity syndications were but fitting examples of the probable
synergies of related diversification, which are to this day entrenched within the
banking industry. On the contrary, Standard interpreted this proposal as an
arrogant and potentially hostile takeover, where they would be acquired, their
assets stripped of all intrinsic economic value, and finally relegated to
Cinderella status.
1.2.3 Strategic fit
At the time of these merger discussions, the South African financial markets
were regarded as both over and under-banked, considering that there were
34-local banks, competing within both the retail and wholesale sectors. The
banking sector was extremely competitive, experiencing declining profits, and
beginning to exhibit strong signals of a maturing-yet ferociously competitive
industry. As a consequence, this fierce competition induced mergers and
acquisitions among former competitors, effectively crowding out weaker rivals
and produced industry consolidation2 .
1. Bancassurance is the selling of insurance through a bank's branch network
2. This point was later confirmed by the subsequent failure of numerous boutique banks
and micro- loan operations, and the formation of ABSA bank was a consequence of
4-banks that had previously merged.
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Seemingly Nedcor regarded this and other acquisitions as opportunities for
actualising its objective of creating an equally stronger competitor, through
this inorganic growth strategy.
1.2.4 Strategic intent
The strategic intent of a company occurs when a company relentlessly
pursues an ambitious strategic objective and concentrates its competitive
actions and energies on achieving that objective.
~ Standard bank's strategic intent was industry leadership on a national and
global scale, and thus differentiated itself through unique and diverse
products.
~ Nedcor's strategic intent was market domination of a particular niche, and
their competitive advantage was to be the lowest cost producer.
Table 1.1: Comparative profiles for Standard and Nedcor banks (Chapter 3)
Competitor Competitive Strategic intent3 Market Competitive Strategic Competitive
Scope Share Position or Posture Strategy
Objective Situation
Nedcor Multi- Dominant Aggressive Going after Aggressive High end
national leadership expansion a different risk taker market niche
Stay on the via market
offensive acquisitions position
Standard Globalised Remain among Expansion Well Mostly Image and
as indicated the top four- via organic entrenched, defensive reputation
in figure 3.2 industry leaders growth able to differentiation
Fortify and defend maintain its
present
position
Source: Standard and Nedcor's annual statements
3
Thompson Arthur A. Jr., and Strickland A.J.; Strategic Management Concepts and
Cases; 13th edition; McGraw Hilllrwin; New York; pp 45
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I compared the strategic divergence of both institutions as captured in table
1.1 above, the contents of which refute the contentious strategic convergence
proposed in paragraph 1.2.2 by Nedcor. If anything, this information
accentuates the strategic divergence, structural dichotomies, and strategic
oddities of these competitors. Additionally, and contrary to popular sectoral
opinion, Standard had cautioned against this merger, and substantiated this
argument with the poor historical record of South African banking mergers.
What's more, Standard also advised that the merged entity's ongoing
sustainability was incumbent upon its ability to harness the strategies of the
two former banks. This would include their core competencies, resource
strengths, and competitive capabilities, a situation that was impossible to
realise, considering Standard's and Nedcor's diverse strategic intents, and
corporate cultures.
Given these discrepancies, Standard did not contemplate the probability of a
successful merger. Hence they continued to clearly articulate their fierce
opposition to this potential takeover, and in no uncertain terms even
threatened serious retaliation should Nedcor continue with this offensive. They
(Standard management) had initially expressed their rejection of a merger
through signalling the likelihood of strong retaliation to fortify their position.
Then again, when Nedcor proved to be more resilient than anticipated, the
upshot of which was fierce competitive rivalry to the point where it deteriorated
into almost personal vendettas. The failure of these prior hints to elicit a
satisfactory rebuttal from Nedcor's management increased the potential for a
scorched earth policy, where Standard management threatened to walk out
en masse in the event of a successful takeover. Unfortunately, Nedcor
regarded all these signals as simple posturing, which further reinforced
Standard's perceptions that Nedcor's management were arrogant and
overconfident of successfully executing their strategic intent.
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1.2.5 Research focus
It is against this background that I will develop this study to focus upon
Standard's strategy development and execution. My intention is to apply the
medium of theoretical information in competitive strategy, and techniques for
analysing industries and competitors alike in this process. My primary and
secondary references are listed on page 119, and will be supplemented by the
Standard Bank website, financial journals, newspaper and magazine articles,
press releases, and published annual financial statements. Furthermore, the
research period will be restricted to the pre-hostile takeover phase of 1998,
through to the first initiative made by Nedcor bank in September 1999, and will
then conclude with the Cabinet pronouncement rejecting the merger, which
occurred during June 2000.
1.3 Motivation for the project
The reason for this research is to examine Standard's corporate culture,
market conditions, industry perceptions, and the internal equity (Standard
banks) that prevailed during the period of the proposed merger. Why did
Nedcor elect to ignore the repeated criticism and rejection of their offer, which
with hindsight resulted in the squander of significant and valuable resources in
a futile takeover effort, and precipitated a fierce and profitless battle for
industry domination? The comparative resource strengths of both competitor
banks are reflected hereunder, and further illustrate Standard's financial and
human resource superiority.
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Table 1.2: Comparative capacity profiles for Standard and Nedcor
Employees Total Assets Shareholders Funds
"Rbn" "Rbn"
STANDARD 31,000 174 13.3
NEDCOR 18,000 126,8 9.8
Source: Internal Standard bank case documents
1.4 Value of the research
Through this study, I will examine Standard's fundamental strategies, and
long-term sustainability, in order to contribute to the abundant body of
intellectual knowledge. This investment will secure Standard bank's relevance
in the dynamic globalising environment wherein it operates.
1.5 Problem statement
Assess the factors that motivated Nedcor to launch a hostile takeover bid for a
competitor that was significantly larger, technological, and financially superior
to it. Review the defensive strategies launched by Standard bank in return,
and identify the restrictive actions (offensive and defensive) unleashed by
Standard bank. Finally, evaluate these measures, their effectiveness, and or
weaknesses in strategy formulation and execution.
1.6 Objectives of the study
The objective of this research includes, amongst others:
~ To investigate the socio-cultural, economic, and political context that
existed during the takeover bid, particularly within the financial sector.
Also, seek to understand their (Standard - Nedcor) competitive corporate
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cultures, and the possible strategic synergies that could have enhanced or
inhibited the success of this proposed merger?
~ Why did this proposition deteriorate into a trial by the media, followed by
costly legal suits, which necessitated political intervention for its ultimate
resolution? Was political intermediation avoidable? Were there no
alternative strategic options within reach to resolve this impasse?
~ Evaluate both institutional responses to the final ruling, and in particular
Standard's defensive strategy, its long-term sustainability, and lessons
learnt to avert another hostile takeover bid. What strategic and
management processes have since been implemented to fortify Standard's
competitive structures?
1.7 Research methodology
Techniques that will be employed in examining the integrated business
strategies of Standard bank prior to the instigation of this takeover bid by
Nedcor Bank will be underpinned by available archived documents pertaining
to the legal case. These references will supplement the primary and
secondary information sources referred to under the research focus section,
and will include high court defence material, minutes of top management
discussions held, internal and external communications, and the verdicts
pronounced by the regulators, namely the South African Reserve Bank, the
Competition Commission, the Registrar of Banks, and the National Cabinet
(National Treasury) respectively, which finally concluded this matter.
1.8 Limitations of the project
Inherent in this research are institutional limitations that will preclude the
publication of sensitive corporate secrets, unpublished, and embargoed
information that the organisation may not desire to avail before the occurrence
of a specific event or occasion. Therefore, all sensitive information that is
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relevant to this study will be included, but only on condition that this
dissertation is not published.
1.9 Structure of the study
The research proposal will be structured as follows:
1.9.1 Chapter two
This chapter will contain discussions of technical theories, and their
respective strategic models.
1.9.2 Chapter three
The models developed or applied in chapter two will underpin detailed
reviews of the case study in this chapter. These reviews will probe the
history of the industry and organisation, its product and services
portfolio, markets, competitors, and customer base.
1.9.3 Chapter four
In this chapter, I will present an evaluation of all information contained
in the preceding chapters, and will use th~ strategy development and
evaluation process, against a "model" developed at the end of chapter
two for this purpose.
1.9.4 Chapter five
Chapter five will contain recommendations.
1.10 Summary
In this chapter, I will summarise the entire research study.
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1.11 Summary: Chapter 1
This chapter merely provides a background to the study, which included the
relevant key arguments of both the potential acquirer and defender of the
merger. This information was intended to clarify the purpose of this
investigation, its objectives, and the analytical methodology, so as to realise
those objectives. Nedcor's business strategy was thus compared to
Standard's through an examination of Standard's primary motivation for the
outright rejection of this merger proposal. This assumption will be validated in





In assessing the effectiveness of Standard bank's strategy for rejecting
Nedcor's merger proposals, specific literature sources will be consulted to
validate Standard's this strategic approach.
The financial sector and its institutions are defined as commercial banks, long
and short-term insurers, re-insurers, managers of collective investment
schemes in securities, investment managers, and other entities that manage
funds on behalf of the public. This sector also includes retirement funds and
members of any exchange that is licensed to trade equities or financial
instruments in the country, and as in most developed economies, the financial
sector plays a central role in enhancing economic growth and development.
The South African financial sector complies wholeheartedly with this definition,
and is thus recognised for its world class benchmarked standards in terms of
its skilled workforce, adequate capital resources, infrastructure and
technology, as well as operating in a conducive regulatory and supervisory
environment.
During the period under discussion, most local banks were well capitalised,
with transparency and supervision generally consistent with international best
practices. These competencies were a direct consequence of the apartheid
legacy, where the imposition of comprehensive economic, cultural, academic,
and technical United Nations sanctions contributed to immense
resourcefulness and sanctions busting demeanour. They effectively led South
Africa's banking sector's relative sophistication, inward focus, and technical
advancement, offering elegant banking services and products akin to those
found in leading economies. However, banking services were still pampering
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the needs of the affluent minority, due to economic disparities, access to
education, employment, wealth accumulation and needs, and yet this sector
exhibited many attributes of maturing industries which include a variety of
factors that impact both supply and demand side factors differently. This was
the case with the banking industry during the period of this investigation, and
some of the most prevalent elements were:
2.1.1 Slowing growth in buyer demand
These effects generate head to head competition for market share, as
competitors search for alternative offerings with which to lure customers from
their rivals. As a result, aggressive marketing tactics intensify.
2.1.2 Buyers become sophisticated, and often drive harder bargains
Buyers familiarise themselves with different product offerings from each
supplier, effectively eroding brand loyalty. Therefore, greater opportunities for
comparing and contrasting diverse new innovations increase their negotiating
power, resulting in value for money and better deals.
2.1.3 Competition produces greater emphasis on cost and service
Competitors modify their products to match buyer preferences, with buyer
choices seeking more combinations of price and services.
2.1.4 Product innovation
Producers find it almost impossible to create new product features to sustain
buyer excitement.
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2.1.5 International competition increases
Therefore growth minded companies seek out sales opportunities in foreign
markets. They cut operating costs, and exploit the greater product
standardisation and diffusion of technological know-how to reduce entry
barriers. This approach makes it possible for enterprising foreign companies
to become serious market contenders in more countries. These are some of
the competitive strategies that were employed by foreign banks during their
migration into the South African banking markets.
These factors manifested themselves in the industry through:
~ The presence of a few very large institutions.
~ Perfect bancassurance and joint ventures as distribution channels that
were largely used to access customers, where dedicated branch networks
and infrastructure were deployed for mass distribution of products and
services.
~ Utilised priority suites, personal bankers, multi disciplined relationship
managers and highly skilled account executives to provide the financial
needs of high value clients, offering them sophisticated financial services,
including digital communications via the Internet, telephone and private
banking. The industry's increasing reliance on technological innovation4,
and the speed with which competitors caught up with each other confirmed
the pervasiveness of the semi strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis5 (EMH).4 On the other hand, unbounded technological
advancements rendered banking a virtual service or product, and
ironically, the major metropolitan areas became the net beneficiaries of
capital infrastructure, at the expense of rural peripheral areas.
4
5
Innovation is doing new things, whilst creativity is thinking up new things.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) refers to the prices of securities which must
fully reflect available information. Investors buying securities in an efficient market
expect to obtain an equilibrium rate of return. Therefore, weak form EMH asserts that
stock prices already reflect all information contained in the history of past prices. The
semi-strong form hypothesis asserts that stock prices already reflect all publicly
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In addition, the industry was divided into wholesale and retail banking
streams, with a fairly homogeneous product range at both the wholesale
and retail levels. Different financial institutions sought to differentiate
themselves on the basis of product innovation and creativity. On the other
hand, globalisation provided long sought after solutions, which in this case
were imported from one country to another, and demanded from local
banks by their clients who had been exposed to them in other international
markets. This point also serves to confirm the semi strong EMH form,
where information advantages are limited to their time to market,
whereafter, competition gains a foothold, thus removing the competitive
advantage to the first mover, competitor, or innovator. It is against this
background that I will focus on Standard's strategy development and
execution, and will apply theoretical information in competitive strategy,
and techniques for analysing industries and competitors.
2.2 The five forces analytical tool
This model was selected for its comprehensive analysis in competitive
situations, as it enables the researcher to extract exceptional analytical value
from complex data sources. My expectation from this brief synopsis is to
enunciate the dominant economic characteristics of the South African
commercial banking industry, where I intend to employ the five-forces
analytical tool for diagnosing the nature and intensity of competitive
environmental forces.
available information, whilst the strong form hypothesis asserts that stock prices
reflect all relevant information including insider information.
Figure 2.1:
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Source: McGraw Hilllrwin; Strategic Management Concepts and Cases; 13
th edition;
Arthur A. Thompson, Jr. and A.J. Strickland 111; New York. pp. 81.
2.2.1 Competitor rivalry
By March 1999, South Africa had ten foreign controlled banks, with 12
branches and 58 representative offices, competing against four first tier6 and
3D-second tier banks. Another 29-niche banks (boutiques) specialised in the
investment and merchant banking scene, competing against 79-foreign banks.
Their scope of competitive rivalry was characterised by intense supply side
measures, and skilled labour shortages. 18
Despite this influx of new banking institutions, most of the concentration
rested amongst the four local commercial banks that dominated the full
spectrum-banking sector (wholesale and retail banking). A further peculiarity
of this industry was the ownership of banks by insurance companies and vice
versa, where the following banks also controlled 80% of the R100 billion asset
6
The big four banks were categorised as the first tier banks, which competed in the
retail, corporate and the micro-lending sectors. The second tier niche banks focussed
on investment banking opportunities, while the small banks or micro-lenders occupied
the third tier banking space.
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base, and were from largest to smallest by asset base Standard, ABSA,
FirstRand, and Nedbank. Each bank was an amalgamation of:
~ Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Ltd. (ABSA Bank) Volkskas Bank,
Trust Bank, United and Allied Building Societies, and were owned by
Sanlam Insurance company.
~ First National Bank and Rand Merchant Bank (FirstRand), which
owned Metropolitan Insurance Company.
~ Standard owned Liberty Life Insurance Company.
~ Nedcor Bank, which was an amalgamation of Nedbank, Syfrets, South
African Permanent Building Society and the Cape of Good Hope Bank,
were owned by Old Mutual Insurance Company.
Industry profitability was therefore driven largely by profit margins which were
approximately 3,5%. These margins were the difference between the SARB
7Repo rate, and the base or Prime8 lending rate. In the wholesale/corporate
banking scene, profitability was determined by the funding structures
proposed to clients, front and rear loads, raising fees, risk profiles, yield
curves, product innovation, sophistication of the structure, and other unique
variables. At best, profit margins were as stated above, and the sector was
segmented into three distinct supplier markets, where the four full spectrum
banks, followed by 3D-second tier niche banks dominated. Third tier
community based financial organisations, or alternative financial institutions
had all but disappeared from the financial services scene, and did not exist
during the period under review.
Due to the efficient sharing of resources particularly in the rural areas where
competitor branch representation was lowest, the banking sector had
7
8
South African Reserve Bank's repurchase rate
The Prime lending rate is the rate commercial banks charge to their best customers
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consolidated sufficiently, and thus realised immense scale economies. The
physical and fidelity security sector was another area for collaboration, where
major banks cooperated successfully in addressing the growing white-collar
criminal activity. However, purchasing, manufacturing, transportation,
marketing, and advertising were regarded as distinct areas for differentiation
and competitive advantage, and became functional areas of great
competition, requiring internal retention and protection.
2.2.2 Suppliers of products and services
As noted above, South Africa was already a domestically concentrated
market, since the major four commercial banks dominated retail banking, the
small and medium enterprise segment, and the commercial/institutional
markets respectively. They collectively supplied almost all transactional
banking products and services directly, or through associates and agents.
This profitable vertical integration effectively crowded out all competition, and
indeed fortified their strong competitive positions. Invariably, such lucrative
market positions became attractive to global banks, which proceeded to
establish South African operations, targeting investment banking and
corporate lending activities. During the occasion of this case, there were:
~ Four first tier banks.
~ 30-second tier competitor banks.
~ An unknown number of matrix institutions that straggled the first and
second tiers, the second and third tiers respectively.
~ An unknown number of third tier community based financial organisations
or alternative financial institutions. A representative list of the primary
competitors are noted in alphabetical order is as follows:
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~ African Bank Ltd
~ African Merchant Bank
~ BOE Bank Ltd
~ Citibank N.A.
~ Commerzbank AG
~ Credit Agricole Indosuez
~ Deutsche Bank AG
~ First National Bank of SA Ltd
~ Gensec Bank Limited
~ Habib Overseas Bank Ltd HBZ Bank Ltd
~ ING Barings
~ Gensec Bank Limited
~ Investee Bank Ltd Mercantile Bank Ltd
~ Nedcor Ltd
~ Rand Merchant Bank Ltd
~ Saambou Bank Ltd
~ SA Post Office
~ The Standard Bank
~ Other banks
2.2.3 Buyers of products and services
The full spectrum South African banks offered both retail and wholesale
banking services, a trend that was discernible throughout the world. They then
categorised the buyers of banking products and services as the personal and
SME's9, which consisted of individuals and (SME's). Their key banking
requirements were variable term and rate deposits (savings and investment
securities), a variety of lending loan products, transactional services (cheque
and credit cards), and insurance and assurance products.
9
Means a small or medium enterprise (with a turnover ranging from R500, 000 per
annum to R20 million per annum) which is wholly owned by Black people.
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By contrast, major corporations and institutions with diverse risk profiles
preferred a combination of debt and capital instruments, high returns, and low
cost investments. They issued and sold debt and equities, transacted mergers
and acquisitions, bought and sold securities, and managed diversified
investment portfolios. These services were largely provided by the small niche
banks, which concentrated on specialised markets, with the full spectrum
banks, focusing upon their traditional retail and corporate markets. In the
meantime, the foreign banks were targeting investment banking opportunities,
and some were teaming up with local Black owned niche merchant banks.
Sadly though, the mainstream banks had elected to ignore potentially poor
borrowers, and often heightened entry barriers to traditional banking services
through onerous qualifying criteria for opening banking accounts, and through
exorbitant banking charges. As a result, almost half of all South Africans could
not access mainstream banking services, relying instead on the informal
banking sector comprising of loan sharks and stokvels. Hence, micro-lenders
identified this competitor gap, and emerged via small time lending firms. They
then enabled the majority population to access credit sources, without the
usually onerous credit control measures that were associated with
mainstream banking.
Buyer bargaining power was complimented by the availability of useful
competitor intelligence, including price and service quality differences. The
diverse product attributes of rival banks, particularly for the personal and SME
markets created most of the competitiveness, and thus first mover advantages
enabled the making of informed financial decisions, effectively enhancing
buyer bargaining positions.
2.2.4 Potential new entrants
By 2000, 79-foreign banks operated in South Africa, with a total market share
of 4.3%. While the foreign banks lured many of the largest corporate clients
from the 34-local banks, they showed no interest in entering the retail banking
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market where start-up costs were high, especially for establishing branch
networks and related infrastructures. Regulatory barriers were equally
formidable. As in other developed markets, South African commercial banks
were heavily regulated, and required a banking license in order to take
deposits. Some of the following inhibiting factors are relevant:
~ The very nature of the financial services industry requires heavy regulation
to protect investor interests, hence heavy regulation that includes a
maximum lending interest rate (usury rate set by the regulators).
~ Most large corporations and institutions were multi-banked, and their
prudential investment policies restricted their investments and deposits
among first and second tier financial institutions only. This situation
favoured the four full spectrum banks, which monopolised this market as a
consequence.
~ An R250m indemnity deposit was required to secure a retail banking
licence.
~ The cost of establishing a physical retail bank network, and its ancillary
capital costs, let alone working capital, fidelity, other risk mitigation and
management systems were prohibitive.
~ Access to properly qualified and experienced labour was nigh impossible,
as training, development, and staff retention costs were also formidable.
2.2.5 Substitute products or services
Given these challenges, it was almost impossible for new local banks to
emerge and compete in this space. This opinion is also confirmed by the
absence of foreign banks in this competitive sector. Therefore, substitute
products were developed and divided into two distinct segments, the personal
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and commercial/institutional markets. I have listed in table 2.2, both traditional
and their substitute derivatives for purposes of clarity.
The range of available products was fairly homogeneous across all full
spectrum banks, with the exception of structured products and special
purpose vehicles, and so were the distribution channels used. Apart from the
traditional product range which is described in table 2.2, an exotic product
portfolio was used as the key differentiator, with SCMB10 leading through the
following innovative range of derivative instruments11, options (currency, debt
and interest rate), swaps, forwards, and financial engineering amongst others.
Pricing of front and rear loads, including service fees varied from one
institution to another, and was the greatest area of gaining or losing market
share. The commercial/institutional market segments were and still are very
sophisticated, and price sensitive too. Equally, most if not all are multi-banked,
which means that due to the size of their balance sheets, and their complex
financial structures, no single bank is large enough or prepared to be 100%
exposed to them.
Consequently, they spread their risks amongst numerous banks, and even
their primary bankers would syndicate these exposures among their peers, or
sell them in the secondary markets to mitigate against concentration risk.
Therefore pricing is underpinned by the prime overdraft rate12, or gilt edged
securities13. Obviously, pricing would range between the bid and offer spread,
thus enable the banks to compete by increasing or decreasing their profit
margins, depending on the importance of the client, and the risk appetite for
low priced securities. Some pricing is thus fixed for the duration of the
security, whilst others would be floating, or a combination of both.
Unfortunately, due to the regulation of prices in the formal banking sector, the





Standard Corporate Merchant Bank is a division of Standard Bank Ltd.
Derived from an underlying security
Interest rate charged to the best customers of a bank
Government stock or bonds
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securities. This maximum interest rate is called the usury rate, which cannot
be exceeded on any lending.
On the distribution front, all four competitors relied solely on their branch,
agencies, and ATM networks. Account executives, relationship managers,
and personal bankers complemented this infrastructure, and looked after high
net worth individuals, the commercial, corporate and institutional markets
respectively.
























Basic financial services including
- Transactional services, being a first order
basic and secure means of storing,
accessing, and transferring cash for day-
to-day purposes.
- Savings and wealth preservation
services, being a first order basic and
secure means of accumulating funds over
time. (E.g. savings ale's, endowment
policies, and mutual funds) Unit trusts
- Credit services, being basic access to
borrowed funds, particularly for major
purchases (e.g. house, car, furniture,
education etc).
Core products delivered through the E-plan,
debit cards, life insurance, funeral policies,
























Black economic empowerment as defined by the government in its strategy for broad-
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iii) Small and Micro - (E.g. Life insurance, Funeral Insurance, Collaboration
Enterprises Burial Society, Household insurance, and between banks, the
(SME's) Medical insurance). government and
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Source: Extracted from Standard bank's annual financial statements and market strategy
documentation 2002
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~ The personal market segment consisted of pension fund trustees, fund
managers, and financial consultants played a critical role in influencing the
flow of funds. Initiatives were therefore developed to enhance their
understanding of investments in general, and specifically their participation
in targeted investments and BEE transactions.
~ The wholesale market segment was dominated by second tier institutions,
SCMB being one who pioneered the development of the over-the-counter
(OTC) interest rate derivative market in 1991, and has remained at the
forefront thereof ever since. SCMB invested heavily in the debt capital
markets, and was recognised as a dominant market leader in the ZAR15
interest rate derivative market. Its market presence and innovation over
the last decade has seen derivative instruments expanding into a full suite
of substitute products, which have been developed in ZAR, but are also
available in USD, EUR, GBP, and Jpy16.
~ In addition, swaps and options were also available for equities, gold, base
metals, energy and other commodity swaps, options and futures. SCMB
also developed an in-house exotic derivative capability, which could
replicate and manage the risk of non-standardised risks, or unusual
combinations of derivative risk. With the increased globalisation of the
South African economy, SCMB found an increasing demand for G717 and
cross-currency interest rate swaps, and had been managing a cross-
currency book since 1994. This capability enabled the bank to offer fast
and fine pricing in derivative solutions, which were the predominant
innovative alternative banking products and services. Additionally, other
niche banks also specialised in the above solutions, but also added to their
bouquet of product offering:
15
16
ZAR means South African Rand denominated securities.
USD means United stated Dollar
EUR means European Union currency, the Euro
GPB refers to the British Pound Sterling
JPY refers to the Japanese Yen
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~ Tailor-made structured solutions for individual customer requirements,
such as the January 1997 innovative establishment of a daily benchmark
"fix" for all metals denominated in South African Rand.
~ Market making obligations both as primary and secondary dealers,
combined with significant bond and interest rate derivatives.
~ Daily summary reports, including market commentaries on the latest prices
across treasury markets.
~ Periodic reports throughout the year, focusing on specific base metals or
topics, with price forecasts, short, medium, and long term views on the
base metal complex, with recommended alternative strategies.
2.3 Literature review
Mergers and acquisitions are an attractive strategy for strengthening a firm's
competitiveness. Mergers allow a company to fill resource gaps or correct
competitive deficiencies, as combining operations can result in lower costs,
stronger technological skills, more or better competitive capabilities and
capacity to expand into new areas. Similarly, they had considered vertical
integration, as vertical integration makes sense if it strengthens a company's
position via cost reductions, or the creation of differentiation based advantage.
It is within this context that the relevant literature will be reviewed.
2.3.1 Offensive and defensive strategies
Offensive strategic moves can be used to secure a competitive advantage.
They are aimed either at competitor strengths, or at their weaknesses.
Additionally, they can involve end runs or grand offensives on many fronts,
and can be designed as guerrilla tactics or pre-emptive strikes to target
17
G7 denotes the Group of 7most developed economic countries
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a market leader. The timing of the strategic move is important. In most cases,
first movers sometimes gain strategic advantage, when low cost provider
strategy executions work well where the products are the same from seller to
seller, buyers are price sensitive, and shop for the lowest price. There must be
limited opportunities to achieve product differentiation that are valuable to
customers as well. Most buyers use the product in the same way and thus
have common user requirements. Buyer's cost of switching from one seller to
another are low or even zero.
As a form of self-preservation, defensive strategies protect a company's
position. They usually take the form of making moves to put obstacles in the
path of would be challengers, and thus fortify the company's present position.
Actions that are undertaken to dissuade rivals from even trying to attack
include signalling that the resulting battle will be more costly to the challenger.
When corporations innovate, a continuous learning environment occurs, which
further enhances organisational competence and creativity, effectively
optimising internal processes, reducing operating and processing costs.
These benefits invariably flow to the customers through efficient service
provision, reduced fee structures, and an effective delivery value chain. Such
technical approaches exhibit modern organisational management systems,
and are graphically illustrated hereunder.
Figure 2.2: Organisational learning and evaluation process
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Source: www.pm-express.com: Performance management system
2.3.2 The balanced scorecard performance management system.
Emerging management philosophies require the integration of strategy
formulation through to final evaluation. Gone are the days when
companies were organised along line and staff functions. Today's
modern organisations demand integrated objectives and strategy
formulation processes, where each functional component is integral
and contributes equally to the final outcome. They all participate
actively in the execution, monitoring, and evaluation thereof, which
management ethos thus requires an equally integrated monitoring and
measurement system. The balanced scorecard is prominent in this
process. What makes it the most preferable is its ability to integrate
strategy elements within the corporate structure, enabling management
to evaluate its performance in an integrated and objective manner.
In addition, the balanced scorecard management system was selected
precisely because of its ability to harness the capacity of an entire
organisation, integrating all executions that support the vision, and thus
harmonise their measurement in an integrated, functional support
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process. Financial and customer objectives are aligned with internal
operating excellence, so is innovation, and learning, which then
becomes self-reinforcing thereby enhances continuous improvement.
Figure 2.2 depicts this measurement process through an easy to follow
cause and effect methodology. Although the measurement elements
are sequentially grouped, each process in the value chain has to be
completed to give effect to the next activity. The process continues
accordingly, and when one element is inconclusive, this triggers an
early warning system, effectively forcing corrections to be implemented,
long before continuing to the next component, and the reasons for
creating a balanced scorecard evaluation system are to:
~ Obtain clarity and consensus about strategy
~ Achieve strategic execution and focus
~ Leadership development
~ Strategic intervention
~ Educate the organisation
~ Set realistic and measurable strategic targets
~ Align programs and investments to the strategy
~ Build an effective feedback system
Therefore, the balanced scorecard management system should communicate
the shared vision, the strategic execution process, and the measurement
systems selected for evaluation must be derived from the company's strategy.
Therefore designing an efficient balanced scorecard process requires a
thorough understanding of the strategic objectives of the company,
whereafter, the company derives its critical success factors for achieving
those objectives. These critical success factors are then cascaded into key
performance indicators.











Source: www.pm-express.com: Performance management system
Therefore, the organisation must develop information support systems that will
gather and present the measurement data, and implementation plans of how
the measurements will be interpreted and applied in the organisation. After
developing these management tools and their measurement systems, the
next imperative is the ability to communicate them efficiently. Clear
communication systems must be formulated to communicate corporate vision,
ethos and strategy to all organisational levels. It goes without saying that
successful organisations depend on successful execution of strategic
objectives. This process must influence people's decision making, focus their
energy and effort, and optimise individual performance.
On the other hand, the strategies must be integrated and aligned to formulate
a strategic plan, which then cascades throughout the organisation. When such
strategies are effectively implemented, agreed-upon values thus become
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entrenched as a consequent. A methodology and process that works must be
simple and integrated, and one of the greatest challenges of cascading
strategy throughout an organisation is its simplicity and presentation in a
readily understandable format. At the same time, such simplicity must not
detract from the integration with performance management systems. These
challenges were thus met in a unique, elegant and practical way by Standard
bank, and the methodology employed is discussed as follows:
2.3.3 Efficient and results producing
Whilst the effort required to effectively cascade strategy cannot be
underestimated, it is critical, in the interest of time that such effort is applied in
an efficient, results producing framework. The delivery process and
methodology is both extremely time efficient, and produces measurable
results in the three dimensions of individual, team and organisational
effectiveness.
2.3.4 Performance measurement
A structured approach to measuring the execution of strategic objectives,
consisting of defining performance measures, measuring, collecting and
processing performance data and timely delivering it to the interested parties.
2.3.5 Performance management
A set of processes and disciplines designed to ensure that the enterprise
accomplishes its strategic objectives. These include organisation design,
compensation systems, feedback, evaluation and learning mechanisms, and
continuous improvement initiatives. Performance management systems are
regarded as a pyramid where, strategic management systems are at the apex
of the pyramid, and the financial and operational performance management
systems make up the middle layer, and finally, transaction systems underpin
the structure.
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2.4 Summary: Chapter 2
Nedcor's timing was therefore crucial, as they waited for Standard to evince
its weakest position. This was premised on a pre-emptive strike, and its
consequent advantages. An aggressive first mover advantage was exploited,
which is an area where Nedcor was sufficiently skilled, and where they
demonstrated better structural and executional cost drivers. As a result,
Nedcor responded by proposing an acquisition offer of one Nedcor share for
5,5 Standard bank shares on 15 November 1999. By this time, there was a
foregone conclusion within the financial sector that Standard bank was going
to be acquired by Nedcor, whose proposed merger benefits were primarily
underpinned by efficiency and empowerment imperatives that accordingly
made significant business sense. In Nedcor's view, South African financial
markets were over banked, considering that there were 34-local banks,
competing within both the retail and wholesale sectors. In addition, these
banks were experiencing declining profits, with the industry beginning to
exhibit strong signals of a maturing-yet ferociously competitive sector.
Nedcor then assumed that it made economic sense to consolidate the
industry, particularly amongst the more stable and successful parties. This
alliance would effectively create a local and regional banking champion, which
would be benchmarked against international competitors. On the contrary
Standard countered and substantiated this argument using the poor historical
record of South African banking mergers. In essence, these discussion points
ultimately became the fundamental reasons for the subsequent hostility that
emerged.
In this chapter, I attempted to unravel the causes of the failed takeover bid
through the use of integrated business strategies as the primary analytical
tools. Other sources of information were complemented by archived Standard
bank documents pertaining to the legal case. As noted above, South Africa's
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financial markets were a domestically concentrated market, with oligopolistic
tendencies, particularly in the retail-banking scene. It was not long before the
entrance of foreign banks, which increased competitiveness. Seemingly, the
different markets were clinically segmented into the personal and SME,
commercial, and institutional sectors. Equally, the products and services were
predominantly homogeneous, and were distributed using similar channels.
For instance, the four full spectrum banks straggled the entire sector, but
dominated the upper personal and SME segments, while dabbling in the other
two segments as well. The foreign bankers simply targeted niche commercial
and corporate clients, and to some extent the institutional markets. The lower
end of the market was the Cinderella sector that really had no banking
champion specialising in its requirements. It was literally ignored by the
mainstream banks, and effectively relied on informal loan sharks whose
practices were predominantly unethical. Consequently, the mainstream
competitors dictated the product range and mix, which was invariably
homogeneous throughout, save for cosmetic modifications here and there.
The cost of margin driven was also determined by the importance of the client,
and ranged from comparatively low for high volume users, to very high for
unsophisticated low volume customers.
Financial institutions are expected to lead through the acquisition of cutting
edge of technology, and continuous product innovation. This imperative is
influenced by the globalised nature of financial markets, and the virtual
banking service, which is a direct consequence of prevailing information
technological advances. This situation encouraged supply side monopolies,
and limited substitute products for the personal and SME segment. This
anomaly was partly attributed to fewer the suppliers, relatively costly delivery
mechanisms leading to limited scope for differentiation. However, at the
upper personal and commercial end, the options were endless, as the service
providers experienced numerous incentives to innovate, in order to retain their
existing customers, attract other customers from their competitors, and
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through this critical mass, reduce their cost to income ratios, whilst increasing
their return on investments.
The analytical theories were then linked to a harmonious measurement
system in the balanced scorecard evaluation system, and their efficacy. These
theories will be disclosed in subsequent chapters, as detailed reviews will be
used to investigate industry history, and to further elaborate on the




3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
3.1 Introduction
The models developed and applied in chapter two will form the basis of a
detailed review of the case study in this chapter. This review will cover the
history of Standard bank, their product and services portfolio, target markets,
competitors, and customer base. Additionally, the review will investigate the
socio-cultural, economic, and political context that existed during the takeover
bid, particularly within the financial sector in general, and will seek to
understand their (Standard - Nedcor) competitive corporate cultures, and the
possible strategic synergies that could have enhanced or inhibited the
success of this proposed merger?
3.2 Historical overview
The final proclamation for the abolishment of slavery in the 1600's, and the
emancipation of freed slaves by President Thomas Jefferson in the United
States of America precipitated the global migration of nations. The African
continent was a net beneficiary of new trading partners, given that slavery was
no longer acceptable as the most favourable trading commodity. Colonisation
of Africa became the new flavour, and the West Coast was the target of the
British, the North and East Coasts were annexed by the Arabs, whilst central
Africa was targeted by the Portuguese, the Belgians and the British alike.
Southern Africa hosted, however grudgingly the Germans in Namibia, the
Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the British in South Africa and
Zimbabwe, and the Dutch also in South Africa.
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3.2.1 Political overview
South Africa was to be characterised by the intensification of apartheid
policies during the 20th century, which had started in earnest during the early
1900's, and was to peak after the Second World War in 1945.17 The 1950's
and middle 1960's saw increased political mass action, treason trials, the
incarceration and exile of political leaders and dissidents, with 1976 to the
1980's producing further mass action that culminated in the democratisation of
the South African political scenario in 1994. In the interim, South Africa had
become a pariah state, with economic, academic/intellectual and cultural
sanctions being imposed by the United Nations, and thus forced the South
African economy to become inwardly focussed, insular, and experienced a
temporary boom. Economic sanctions led to disinvestments by foreign
companies, and local management's then instituted MBO's18, which gave birth
to the First National Bank, formerly Barclays bank London, Standard Bank of
South Africa, formerly Standard Chartered Bank of London, and Nedbank the
former Netherlands bank. As a result of anti-apartheid pressures and
comprehensive United Nations sanctions, many South African companies
experienced reduced investment options, and thus resorted to buying stakes
in each other, which also buoyed prevailing bancassurance relationships.
Other industry sectors also experienced the emergence of South African
companies, which were offshoots of their disinvesting foreign principals. Local
insurance companies underwrote most of these acquisitions, leading to a
strong liaison between them and local banks. Hence, circular shareholding
arrangements became a common feature of South Africa's corporate
landscape.
18
Management buy outs, where local management raised funds from both equity and
debt markets, to acquire assets of their divesting principals.
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After the dismantling of apartheid, the new government promoted
privatisation, market liberalisation, and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE),
three distinct economy transformation policies.?
The goal of privatisation was to make traditionally state owned enterprises
(SOE's) more efficient, attract more foreign investment and technology, and
effectively reduce government debt. Equally, market liberalisation sought to
establish democratic institutions, a bill of rights, an independent judiciary, a
free press, and free political interaction, trade liberalisation and the removal of
extensive protection barriers, whilst promoting an outward looking market
strategy. These policies were designed to attract foreign direct investments,
and increase the competitiveness of domestic companies. Furthermore, Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) initiatives were intended to improve the socio-
economic status of Blacks, and included supply push efforts to provide
favourable terms for securing Government licenses and procurement
contracts. To give effect to this policy, the government passed the
Employment Equity Act in 1999, requiring all companies with more than 50-
employees to submit annual reports documenting progress plans towards
proportional representation by designated groups. A BEE Act was
subsequently promulgated in 2003, for the selfsame reasons as articulated in
1999.
3.2.2 Economic sector
During the 20th century, the main pillars of South Africa's economy were still
the traditional primary sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, mining and the
tertiary sector. Despite its reliance on the primary sectors, South Africa had a
well-developed tertiary sector, especially its financial markets which were the
largest, and constituted 65% of 1999 GDP.1 The mood in the South African
economy during 1998 was one of cautious optimism, with declining bond
yields from October 1998, which then levelled off in the first quarter of 2000.
After the financial shocks of 1997-1998, the economy appeared to be on a
solid recovery path. Having managed a low positive growth of 0.6% in 1998,
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the economy gained further in 1999 by increasing at a nominal 1%. Signs of
strong growth were discernible in the fourth quarter, when the economy
surged by 3,6% annualised.
At the same time, interest rates began to decline in the middle October 1998,
with prime overdraft rates declining from 23% at the end of 1998 to 15,5% by
the end of 1999. The inflation outlook remained contained at 5,2% (1999)
relative to the 6,9% (1998), with core inflation at 7,9% (1999) 7,5% (1998).
Sentiment in the bond market boosted secondary market turnover in 1999,
with private consumption spending significantly constrained by the high
interest rates regime.
3.2.3 Exchange controls
There were no substantial restrictions on current account transactions, but
there were certain restrictions on outward investment by residents. With
regard to financial institutions, approval was required from the South African
Reserve Bank for a South African resident to borrow from a non-resident, and
documentary proof was required before foreign exchange was provided for
import payments. Therefore, exporters had to ascertain that the proceeds of
their exports were received in South Africa within six-months of shipment,
obviously with no restrictions on the repatriation of profits, or on the transfer of
dividends or branch profits. Moreover, companies were allowed only on
application to make offshore acquisitions within certain country or region
specific limits.
3.2.4 Labour and employment
Poor employer/employee relations, the apartheid legacy, political autocracy,
collusion between the then government and business bred strong left wing
allied trade union federations. The divide and rule apartheid policies were
deliberately created to undermine the intellectual development of the Black
population as represented in table 3.5, and these policies were efficiently
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executed through the provIsion of poor quality education. They were
implemented comprehensively, and effectively restricted Black people to
under resourced homeland based tertiary institutions only.
Likewise, the academic subjects and modules offered at these homeland
institutions were overwhelmingly skewered towards the humanities, religious
instruction, languages, and educational faculties. Mathematics, science,
commerce, business, and technology subjects were not offered, resulting in
these institutions producing graduates that were largely incompetent for the
requirements of the broader economy. Racism also remained a factor, where
Whites were paid twice as much as Blacks for undertaking the same
occupations with compatible skills and experience. As a result, unemployment
and abject poverty levels among the African population reached alarming
proportions, with around 40% unemployed. These policies were indirectly
responsible for the emergence of hostile labour federations, which affiliated to
the IL019 , and essentially mobilised their resources to address these glaring
socio-economic disparities.
This dichotomy contributed to the twin evils of economic development, in the
form of high unemployment on the one hand, coupled with an insatiable
demand for skilled labour on the other. Besides unemployment, the labour
scene was characterised by adversarial trade union relationships, owing to the
polarisation of the workplace. Incidentally, this was the only outlet for political
expression during the repression. However, as democratisation took effect in
the mid 1990's, the CCMA was established to create a co-operative climate
through conciliation and mediation in labour disputes.
3.2.5 Statistical overview 12
According to the final results of the 1996 census, Statistics South Africa




Racial distribution of national population
Race Number Proportion of total % Proportion of total
% <15-years
African 31 127631 76,7 36
Coloured 3600466 8,9
Indian/Asian 1 045596 2,6
White 4434697 10,9 21
Unspecified / other 375204 0,9
Total 40583573 100,00% +/ -34%
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
Real per capita GDP R22, 169 (1997) ($3,167), and of this 40,6 million
~ 6,5% or 2,7 million were disabled, another
~ 41 % had visual disabilities, and
~ 34% were under 15-years of age.
Table 3.2: Gender distribution of national population
Total population Men Women Average Life
expectancy
40,6 million 48% 52% 55
Source:
19
South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
The International Labour Organisation
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Table 3.3: Population distribution older than 65-years
Total population Total > 65 years Women >65 Men >65
40,6 million 5% 6% 4%
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
3.2.6 Education
Table 3.4: Education levels of people 20-years and older: 1996
No Some Some Grade Higher Unspecifie Total
Schooling Primary Secondar 12 d Other
y
4066187 5084189 7130121 3458 1294 1 112568 22146220
434 720
18% 23% 32% 15.6% 5.8% 5% 100,00%
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
This table indicates that:
~ 18% of the population under 20-years had no education
~ 23% had some primary education
~ 32% had some secondary education
~ 16% had completed grade 12
~ 6% had some form of post matriculation education
Table 3.5:
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Education levels of people 20-years and older by race: 1996
African Coloured % Indian/Asian White Total
% % % %
Higher 3,0 4,3 10,0 24,1 6,2
Grade 12 12,1 12,3 30,4 40,7 16,4
Some Secondary 32,8 42,5 40,0 32,8 33,9
Some/complete 27,8 30,7 13,1 1,2 24,2
primary
None 24,3 10,2 6,5 1,2 19,3
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
The above table indicates that almost a quarter of Africans had no education,
compared to 10% of Coloureds, 7% Indians and 1% Whites.
Table 3.6: Illiterate population aged 20-years and older: 1996
Male Female Total Proportion of
total population
0/0
3373305 4205297 7578602 36
Source: Education Statistics of South Africa; Survey 1999 - 2000. Millennium edition;
South African Institute of Race relations
In Addition, 36% or 7,6 million of the total population aged 20-years or older
were illiterate2o. Comparatively, more women 55% than men 45% were
illiterate.
20
Illiteracy was defined as fewer than seven years of formal schooling obtained.
Table 3.7:
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Senior certificate results: 1979-1998
Total Candidates Proportion Candidates Matric




1979 85276 74313 87 32460 38
1998 552862 272501 49 69861 13
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
Between1979 and 1998 senior certificate examination candidates increased
by 548%. The number passing increased by 267%, while the number
obtaining matriculation exemption increased by 115%.
Table 3.8: Racial breakdown of total degrees and certificates awarded by
tertiary institutions
Race % 1996 % 1995
African 44 35
White 45 53
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations; 1999 - 2000; South Africa Survey;
Millennium edition; SAIRR; Johannesburg.
Total number of degrees, diplomas, and certificates awarded by universities
and technikons increased by 29% between 1992-1996, and were distributed
as represented above. Additionally, the number of students who received
loans from the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA) increased by
777% since 1991, while the total amount allocated to assist needy students
increased by 1496%. 26% of the 361 000 teachers were considered
unqualified or under-qualified, having less than a senior certificate and a three
year teaching qualification. The content of these tables illustrates the poor
academic conditions that prevailed prior to democratisation.
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3.3 The banking industry in general 3
In most economies the financial sector plays a central role in enhancing
growth and development. South Africa was no exception, and its financial
sector was recognised for its world-class status. This recognition affirmed
South Africa's skilled workforce, its adequate capital resources, infrastructure
and technology, and the conducive operating, regulatory and supervisory
environment. Specific actions were thus expected from the sector, which
related to ensuring the provision of basic financial services including:
~ Sustainable and affordable banking services, contractual savings
schemes, credit for poor households, access to capital for small and micro
enterprises.
~ The development of sustainable institutions to serve poor communities.
~ Support for the establishment of third tier community based financial
organisations or alternative financial institutions.
~ Efficient delivery of financial services, which enhance the accumulation of
savings, directing them to developmental purposes.
3.4 The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. 1
The Standard bank was established during the boom years of the 1850's in
Port Elizabeth. At the time, there was great prominence in the economy of the
then Cape colony, but merchants felt severely the want of capital resources.
In 1857, the "Standard bank of Port Elizabeth" was proposed by leading local
merchants, and in April 1860; a prospectus of the Standard bank of British
South Africa was issued with a proposed capital of 1,500, 000 Pound Sterling.
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This was followed on 13 October 1862 by the signing of the Memorandum of
Association for the Standard bank of British South Africa Ltd. The bank was
duly registered on 15 October 1862, with a nominal capital of one million
pounds, and commenced business in Port Elizabeth on 16 January 1863. It
grew rapidly and opened branches in Durban (June), and Bloemfontein
(October) 1863. At the time, two older local competitor banks were already in
operation, and the sixties proved to be a period of intense depression, as
reported by the bank manager in June 30 1864.1
Following the slump of the 1860's, the 1870's were characterised by a
massive economic boom that was fuelled by diamond mining, wool exports
and capital imports for railway construction. In the second half of the decade
though, the boom faded, culminating in a deep depression of the early 1880's.
As that depression eased, gold mining emerged as the new locomotive for the
economy of the sub-continent, leading to a tremendous boom in the latter
1880's. That boom was in turn succeeded by a slump in 1890, from which the
economy made a slow recovery. Further progress was inhibited in the middle
to late 1890's by a series of agricultural calamities such as droughts, cattle
disease, and locusts. Increasing tensions under these difficult circumstances
ultimately produced war between Britain and the Boer republics in 1899, and it
was only in 1902 that peace was restored. The fortunes of Standard varied
considerably over the last third quarter of the 19th century, though the bank
remained the largest financial institution in South Africa at the time.
The London-based Standard Chartered, which eventually became a global
giant specialising in emerging markets banking, was Standard's owner,
although the bank was managed out of South Africa. By 1900, the bank had
100-branches throughout Southern Africa, and had become the area's most
stable and profitable bank, a position it maintained until the early 1990's. Its
centenary milestones were celebrated in 1982, and included the launch of its
image enhancing campaign "there's a bank that understands," and the bank
took occupation of its new administration building, the Super Block at six
Simmonds Street, Johannesburg. Simultaneously, the Society of Worldwide
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Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) was introduced in South
Africa. Standard and 17-other local banks were amongst the first to be linked
to SWIFT.
In figure 3.1 hereunder, I illustrate the structural organisation of Standard
Bank, which clearly shows the differentiated businesses of its wholesale
merchant banking activities from its retail personal segments. In addition, the
different business components comprising each stream are reflected therein.
Figure 3.1: Standard bank's group profile
Wholesale Banking Retail Banking
Gr.,t Kt'a! don't k.ep office hours. ~it3 'J I:I
~..::-,~
Source: Formulated from internal Standard bank reports
Financial difficulties, and the growing momentum of the anti-apartheid
movement pressurised Standard Chartered to sell its 40% interest in the bank
in 1987. Liberty Life bought the bulk of these shares, at which time, Liberty
was the third-largest insurance company in the country, and was also partly
owned by Standard. Depicted hereunder is the representational strength of
Standard bank outside of the African continent.
Figure 3.2: Standard bank's international presence
46
Source: Formulated from internal Standard bank reports
This figure merely indicates the global nature of Standard bank, and the
extent of its physical location on the world stage.
3.4.1 Channel segmentation of the personal market
Standard bank segmented the personal market into three-areas, as the upper
class, middle-income group, and the mass market as denoted in table 2.2.
Different delivery channels were thus created to differentiate and target these
markets separately. For instance, the upper income retail customers were
serviced through priority suites and dedicated personal bankers, which are
separate delivery channels that are located outside branches, and where
customers would receive dedicated personalised service. The middle-income
groups were serviced within the branch infrastructure, whilst mass-market
customers transacted through E-Plan centres. These were off site centres,
which were staffed by officials who could converse in the different indigenous
languages that occur in the country. Customers were then addressed in any of
these preferred languages, and were thus empowered with the mechanics of
operating ATM's in such pleasant circumstances. Because there was no back
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office in this delivery channel, ATM technology significantly reduced
transactions costs.
3.5 Nedcor bank
The Nedcor banking Group was founded in 1888 as the Netherlands Bank of
South Africa (NBSA). When Germany occupied the Netherlands during World
War 11, all of the bank's Dutch assets were temporarily transferred to South
Africa, and after the war, the NBSA exercised increasing independence from
its parent bank, finally severing all ties with the mother country in 1976. In the
post-war period, the NBSA's market position within the South African banking
scene improved from a 3% share in 1945 to a 10% to 15% share by the
middle 1970s, firmly establishing Nedcor among the country's top four
commercial banks. Nedcor was regarded as a wholesale businessman's bank
rather than a retail bank during this period. It traditionally had a smaller branch
network than the other three banks, focusing more on foreign trade and
industrial financing.
However, as a result of taking a massive position in the gilt market in 1986,
Nedcor teetered on the verge of bankruptcy, but was rescued in a
government-arranged bailout by Old Mutual, which acquired a controlling
interest (54%) in the bank. Nedcor continued its slow recovery in the late
1980's, but remained less profitable than the market-leading banks. In 1989,
Nedcor acquired South African Permanent Building Society (SA Perm), and
integrated SA Perm into its retail network. By then, Nedcor had acquired an
investment bank Syfrets, and combined the retail infrastructure of Nedbank,
SA Perm, and the Cape of Good Hope Bank to serve its lower income
customer base. After briefly flirting with bankruptcy, Nedcor emerged during
the 1990's as South Africa's most profitable bank. Similarly, prevailing market
interpretations regarded Nedcor's management team as vastly superior in
terms of articulating and executing a clear strategic vision for their bank.
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3.5.1 Nedcor's strategic focus
During the 1990's, Nedcor returned to its earlier roots as a bank for
businesses and wealthy individuals. This back to your roots approach was
ascribed partly to its earlier brush with bankruptcy, and its original strategy,
which Was based on risk avoidance. Nedcor was also obsessed with
improving its cost to income ratio, and were acutely aware of increasing
operating costs that arose from serving smaller accounts. By this time, most of
Nedcor's profits were derived from serving the upper end of the savings and
investing market, and therefore, having the right customers was more
important than having many customers. Nedcor then decided to focus on
corporate lending, mortgages, and high-income individuals, offering better
service rather than better pricing. As a consequence, Nedcor divided and
rebranded SA Perm into two separate banks, namely the Permanent and
Peoples bank. Permanent was dedicated to serving middle-income retail
customers, and Peoples bank, the low-end mass market. Through this
transition, Nedcor lost approximately 800,000 of its four million retail accounts
due to the following factors: 19
~ Permanent bank required a minimum account balance of R5, 000 thus
forcing the majority of Permanent bank customers to switch to Peoples
bank, or alternatively to competitor banks.
~ Nedcor divided up Permanent bank's branch network unequally, giving
Peoples bank just 30% of the branches. People's bank customers were
deprived of convenient branch access, and faced penalty bank charges for
using Permanent bank branch networks.
~ Nedcor's obsession with becoming the industry's lowest cost producer
resulted in exorbitant increases in their transaction fees at all its banking
brands, which thus became marginally higher than industry benchmarks,
including for the high-end customer segments. For example, they imposed
a monthly administrative fee of R15 per month on all accounts, an attempt
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aimed at improving their cost to income ratio. Nedcor then invested heavily
in technological upgrades, to apply its effort of becoming a digital bank,
with low-cost, largely automated branches. It successfully migrated to a
Microsoft platform in 1993, which unified its entire branch network. During
the scale-back at Permanent, the bank used its marketing sawy with
advertising to maintain its reputation as a "bank of the people," even
though it was trying to move up-market.
3.6 Continental strategies of South African banks into the SADC21 regionS
South African banks were encouraged to extend their operations into Africa, in
order to service their clients who were migrating into the region. These banks
entered the SADC by acquiring stakes in existing banks, or by acquiring an
entire local bank.
ABSA and Nedcor had ventured into SADC countries by acquiring stakes in
locally operating banks. This form of investment gained them precious time to
get acquainted with domestic conditions of the host country, and provided
them their first mover advantages of lowering market leader and innovator
risks. As a result, most South African banks that had ventured into the region
were achieving phenomenal returns fro~ these investments, and gainfully
deployed the experience attained in South Africa, a market that was
considerably similar in more ways to those in other African countries.
Competition was tough though, particularly from the major global players such
as Standard Chartered and Barclays of the UK, and Citigroup from the USA
who were operating in the same markets.
21
Southern African Development Communities (SADC)
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3.6.1 Amalgamated banks of South Africa (ABSA).
ABSA's SADC strategy was to acquire one bank in a different country each
year for the next few years. Their first African investment was made in 1998,
through the acquisition of a 26% interest in the Commercial Bank of
Zimbabwe. In 1990, they subsequently bought 36% equity in the Windhoek
bank of Namibia, and a 55% stake in Tanzania's largest bank, the National
Bank of Commerce (NBC). Since August 1999, ABSA had been providing
management services to this bank on behalf of the Tanzanian government.
3.6.2 First National bank (FNB).
FNB had extended its banking services outside South Africa, and had
established itself as a major player in Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland.
These FNB subsidiaries employed nearly 2,000 people, mainly local nationals,
and contributed about 10% of group profits. FNB entered Swaziland in 1995,
when it acquired Meridian BIAG Bank of Swaziland.
3.6.3 Investee bank
In June 1996, Investee opened Banco Africano de Investmentos to support its
South African operations in Angola. A Mauritian bank, and the Banque Privee
Edmond de Rothschild followed this investment in 1997.
3.6.4 Nedcor bank
Nedcor had been active in seven SADC countries. In 1994, they obtained a
47.3% shareholding in the Commercial Bank of Namibia, and had held 29.3%
in the Merchant Bank of Central Africa in Zimbabwe since 1993. This was
followed by the acquisition of a 20.1 % stake in the State Bank of Mauritius,
which effectively made Nedcor the second largest shareholder after the
government. In July 1999, Nedcor acquired a stake in the Finance
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Corporation of Malawi, which has since become their wholly owned foreign
subsidiary.
3.7 Standard bank (Stanbic Africa Group).
Standard first expanded into sub-Saharan Africa by focusing on trade finance,
whilst servicing South African corporate clients as they ventured north. This
demand-pull strategy was based on the bank's South African customers, who
were diversifying into continental markets, and as such led this migration.
Because of their confidence in the capabilities of the bank, these clients
initiated discussions of SADC specific opportunities that the bank could
capitalise upon, given its asset and capacity base. It was precisely this pent
up demand for debt capital that initiated the bank's forays into Africa, and
subsequently fuelled its diversification into retail banking operations.
Standard's strategy had been mixed initially, as it acquired stakes in some
local banks, as well as entire banks in Tanzania and Lesotho. Its movement
into Africa began in 1995 with acquisitions in Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Lesotho. In Mozambique, Standard acquired a 40.72% stake in Banco
Standard Totta, and in Tanzania, the Meridien BIAG group, and renamed it
Standard Bank Tanzania. It then acquired Barclays Bank of Lesotho, and later
renamed it Standard Bank Lesotho, and extended its presence there in 1999
by taking a 20% stake in the Bank of Lesotho, which increased to 70% after a
three-month restructuring exercise. Standard bank has since established a
substantial footprint in Africa, where it conducts its business trades as Stanbic
Africa Group. This trading name was deliberately chosen to avoid confusion
with Standard's former owner and current competitor in Africa, Standard
Chartered Bank. Since then, Stanbic Africa has invested R391-million since
1995 in 17-African countries outside South Africa, and employs more than 5,
500 people.
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Figure 3.3: Stanbic Africa Group-Branch Infrastructure
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Standard's continental, and sub-Saharan representation is depicted in figure
3.3 above, and in 1997, Standard injected R46m in new equity capital into
Stanbic Zimbabwe, thus securing full control of its Zimbabwean subsidiary.
Similarly in August 1998, an R27m investment of new equity capital into
Stanbic Zambia transformed the bank into a wholly owned subsidiary. By
1998, Stanbic Africa held a 65% share in Barclays Bank of Swaziland. This
stake was bought from Barclays Bank of London, a deal that precipitated a
merger of Standard and Barclays' operations in Swaziland, with the merged
entity now operating as Stanbic Swaziland.
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3.8 Nedcor's aggressive first mover offensive strategy
As Nedcor consolidated its competitive position, it was covertly seeking a
credible acquisition with acceptable retail and wholesale banking competence,
in order to actualise its growth objectives. The following weaknesses made
Standard bank the ideal takeover target.
~ By August 1999, Liberty Life held 10% of Standard bank shares. In the
past, Standard had been able to get shareholder approval for its actions by
bringing its two largest shareholders together, namely Liberty and Old
Mutual, which jointly held over 60% of Standard bank. After Liberty Life
unbundled its Standard bank shareholding, Old Mutual became the largest
shareholder (at 21 %) and no other shareholder held more than 10%. As
the market became flooded with Standard Bank shares, its price dropped,
and earnings growth dipped to 8% after years of +20% increases.
~ Standard's share price had already been damaged by a number of bad
credit decisions between 1994 and 1998.20 The most significant thereof
are:
~ The loss of R150m after Russia defaulted on its debt in 1998.21
~ The bankruptcy of Pepsi Cola's South African franchise holder.
~ The issuance of a credit card on behalf of Woolworth's, and
~ The liquidation of a number of South African businesses.
In addition, Standard's global growth strategies were regarded as responsible
for the thin dispersal of management capability over wide diverse markets,
which culminated in the lack of a composite strategic focus. One top Standard
executive conceded that if the bank's best personnel had been concentrated
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in the country rather than in London or other parts of Africa, many of these
bad debts would have been avoided.
~ In certain financial quarters, Standard's management was regarded as
having lost the confidence of its shareholders. They were perceived as
arrogant, insular, and unable to articulate what Standard stood for.
Equally, their attitude was perceived as not really caring whether the
performance of the stock was lagging that of its peer group or not. Nedcor
then seized upon this opportunity, and exercised its first mover strategy, by
which time, Nedcor already held 26.1 % of Standard's issued share capital
through its associates, as follows.
Table 3.9: Old Mutual's shareholding in Standard bank
21,4%
Old Mutual policyholders and shareholders funds 0,5%
Mutual and Federal 1,4%
NIB asset Management 0,5%
Old Mutual administered pension funds 2,3%
Old Mutual asset Management
Total 26,1%
Source: Formulated from internal Standard bank reports
Nedcor intended to combine the two businesses, and as such, create a
fundamentally better banking group for the benefit of South Africa and all its
stakeholders. They argued that the proposed transaction was not going to
prevent or lessen competition substantially, since the relevant market in which
the parties conduct business is the financial services industry in general,
which is not limited to the business of retail banking only. Part of this rationale
was based on substantial public interest grounds, and that the merged entity
will potentially enhance the ability to provide credit to the under banked mass
market, it will result in the creation of a regional bank with sufficient scale to
enhance trade across South Africa, whilst also contributing to the
enhancement of SADC and continent wide banking. This capacity will result in
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sufficient Black Economic Empowerment opportunities. It is against this
background that Nedcor decided to implement its takeover strategy.
3.9 Nedcor's anticipated merger benefits
In 1999, Nedcor presented its initial merger proposal of the two banks to the
board of Standard, and suggested that the potential greater scale arising from
a merger would achieve the following five main benefits:
~ The merged bank would be able to cut costs, as it could combine
administrative back and head office operations, reduce overlapping
branches, and reap the benefits of sharing future technology such as
smart cards and Internet banking. Nedcor estimated that it could trim
R1.9billion per year after tax by 2002 from the merged company, and
could bring the merged bank's cost to income ratio below 50%.
~ After some initial revenue losses, the merger would lead to long-run
revenue growth. The initial revenue losses would result as the merged
bank exited certain high-risk markets, and as corporate clients
redistributed their banking portfolios. Likewise, Nedcor believed that
revenue would increase in the longer term as the group expanded into new
markets, including the historically under banked mass markets.
~ The merger would improve the financial health of the banks' by creating a
stronger capital structure, greater free cash flow, and a reduced risk
profile.
~ A merger would improve the efficiency of South Africa's banking sector,
which Nedcor characterised as over-banked, and that the merged bank
would be better positioned to compete internationally. There was an urgent
need for consolidation of the excess banking capacity, which had been
aggravated by the many new foreign and local arrivals on the banking
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scene since 1994. Nedcor asserted therefore that they were well placed to
meet the challenges outlined above, and believed however that their
shareholders, Standard bank shareholders, and the country as a whole
would further benefit from the creation of a highly efficient and well
capitalised bank of international scale. Nedcor then structured their bid as
embodied in the announcements made on 15 November 1999, which
entailed a three-stage process as follows:
~ The first stage was a bid for 50, 1% of Standard's capital, the partial offer.
~ The second was the reconstitution of Standard's, and thereafter Liberty
Life's boards.
~ Finally, there would be a scheme of arrangement proposed by Standard
bank for the acquisition of the remaining shareholding not already held by
Old Mutual/ Nedcor, resulting in the expropriation of any dissenting
minorities as usually happens under a scheme of arrangement process.
On the other hand, it was not feasible to mount a take-over offer for over 90%
of Standard's capital, since Liberty still held more than 10%, and Liblife
Controlling Corporation, a Standard bank subsidiary another 7%. Nor was it
possible to proceed under a scheme of arrangement, as that could only
happen if Standard bank was a willing party. A combination of the two
procedures may have done the trick though, as once control of Standard and
Liberty were obtained, the 17% shareholders that would otherwise vote
against the bid could easily be converted into votes in favour. Nevertheless
this was a questionable structure. Standard bank challenged it in all its official
announcements, and stood ready to contest its legality before the courts.
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Another crucial variable was the extent to which Old Mutual and Nedcor were
to be regarded as concert parties for the purpose of the SRP Code22 . On any
common sense reading of the matter they were, but the law does not always
embody everyone's idea of common sense. Instead they offered to do a stock
swap that was based on then current market prices of about six Standard
shares for each Nedcor share. Nedcor argued that market prices were a fair
indicator of value, because both banks had recently gone on road shows, and
had placed substantially useful information at the disposal of market analysts.
3.10 Standard bank's defensive strategy
Standard had always maintained that a merger with Nedcor could not be
justified as being in the public interest, and that a successful defence could be
mounted on those grounds. The failed Canadian bank mergers influenced this
opinion. Only a year earlier, two of the major four Canadian banks decided to
merge, stating as their motivation that it would increase their ability to
compete with their powerful American rivals south of the border. This merger,
which was a friendly one, prompted the other two of the four majors to rise to
the challenge, and they also decided to merge. These two merger applications
were then submitted to the Canadian Competition Bureau that undertook a
very thorough investigation of the Canadian banking industry. This authority
eventually rejected both mergers, because the mergers would have grossly
undermined domestic banking competition, which far outweighed their
strategy of creating national champions.
This Canadian precedent was thus applicable to the SA banking situation too,
and it was clear that Standard would have to argue the public interest
questions thoroughly, and even resort to the regulators as the umpires in
need.22 However, it was wisely decided to focus Standard's strategic defence
22
Section 440B of the Companies Act, makes provision for a Securities Regulation
Panel to be consulted in such transactions
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on the commercial issues, to play the regulatory card further down the line,
and hence focus the rejection of Nedcor's proposals on the commercial
issues, and on the significant risks involved in implementing the proposed
merger. Flowing from that stance, Standard held international road shows to
the investment community, and made the following groundbreaking
announcements:
~ Leadership change
~ A stand-alone case, and
~ New management team
Parallel with this, the legal strategy of defending the bid was evolving.23 The
bid as announced on 15 November 1999 stated that first; approval under the
Banks Act would be sought and obtained before the offer was sent out.
Nedcor followed its announcement by submitting its application for approval to
the Registrar of Banks as required. On the other hand, at Standard's initial
meeting with the Competition Commission, they were informed that the
Commission did not have substantive jurisdiction to rule on the bid, and would
only fulfil a consultative role in terms of the Banks Act. Standard disputed that
position and, consistent with its stance, made a full filing with them in terms of
the requirements of the Act, and duly paid their substantial R500, 000 fee. 24
3.10.1 Why the merger should be disallowed25
Standard had countered that unprecedented levels of market dominance and
concentration, which were contrary to those permitted in comparable
jurisdictions would result. Systemic risks would be increased by the hostile
nature of the transaction, with potentially negative implications for South
Africa's sovereign ratings. There would be a concentration of ownership of
financial services in the hands of Old Mutual and its offshore investors, and
the effective competitor to Nedcor and Old Mutual through the Standard and
59
Liberty alliance would be destroyed, increasing unemployment in a profitable
industry.
On the technological front, the merger would reduce innovation as a result of
inward focus and decreased competition for South Africa's strongest banks.
Standard's mass-market strategy may also be eroded,26 and equally, South
Africa's potential to produce an acceptable counter-party to facilitate
international trade could be destabilised.
3.10.2 No synergies
First, Standard questioned Nedcor's estimates of the potential synergies, and
argued that most bank mergers did not produce their predicted returns. In
support of this, they cited a study for the impact of globalisation on the
financial services industry, which demonstrated that this sector had no
geographic boundaries. All banks were effectively in competition with one
another, and South African banks effectively compete with other financial
service providers worldwide.
3.10.3 Consolidation trends
South Africa was already a domestically concentrated market, since the large
four banks dominated the retail market, the small and medium enterprise
(SME) market, and the commercial and institutional markets respectively.
Therefore, a Eurocentric style regional expansion was not relevant to the
South African banking industry, asserted Standard, and also disagreed with
the notion of creating a combined bank that would ultimately have a market
share that is well in excess of those permitted in other countries such as
Canada and Australia. In essence, the combined bank would have market
shares of 52% in retail cash, cheque, and transmission accounts, 40% in
mortgages, and 54% in credit cards. For that reason, these higher market
concentration levels would encourage the development of oligopolistic
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practices, higher than normal consumer prices, and reduced customer
service.
3.10.4 Proposed national champion27
Nedcor's "national champion" argument was emotive and illogical, since the
Nedcor/Standard combination would rank 144th in the world in terms of the
1998 total assets. Furthermore, Nedcor contributed nothing to enhance
Standard's existing global profile. Besides, Standard challenged Nedcor's
contention that the merged bank would be internationally competitive, and
also argued that a South African bank was in a weak position to challenge the
large international banks, because its capital was denominated in a softer
currency, the South African Rand. A bank with Rand-based assets, however
large, was unlikely to compete effectively with international banks whose
assets were denominated in the world's more stable and liquid currencies.
Any sustained attempt to compete with these banks in mainstream banking
outside Africa would undermine its sustainability, and thus increase the risk of
failure for the merged entity.
3.10.5 Bank mergers can and do fail
A Deloitte and Touche research report on consolidations by global banks
concluded that most mergers simply have not delivered the benefits that were
promised, and proceeded to highlight three key reasons for this failure, which
were:
~ Unanticipated difficulties with the integration of information technology in IT
integration.
~ Mergers failed to draw on the strengths of each organisation, and
~ Mergers ignored the impact on employees.
3.10.6 Hostility exacerbates merger risks
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By its very nature, hostility substantially increases execution risks, and whilst
estimates of synergy benefits tend to be realistic, revenue losses tend to be
under estimated. Using this information, Standard questioned Nedcor's
estimates of the potential synergies, arguing that most bank mergers did not
produce the predicted returns. This was the case in an analysis of US bank
profitability as measured by return on assets between 1988 and 1997. The
results showed that the 10-largest banks were in fact the least profitable over
this period. In addition, the U.S. Federal Reserve bank found that 50% of
mergers by large banks eroded returns, while only 17% yielded positive
returns. In support thereof, they cited a study of the Wells Fargo and First
Interstate as the only relevant case study with sufficient history to analyse.
Unfortunately, this merged entity collapsed and was a dismal failure. Another
recent example was the Netherlands BNP Paribas, a hostile takeover that is
reported to have already experienced business problems.
3.10.7 Similar transactions were prevented in other jurisdictions
In 1998, Canada rejected two proposed mergers amongst that country's top
four banks, whereas Australia rejected all banking mergers among its top four
banks.
3.10.8 Vastly increased systemic risks28
In developed economies, banking regulators determined that no bank was
large enough such that its failure could threaten the entire economy and
taxpayers alike. In the U.S. for example, no bank could hold more than 10% of
total banking deposits. In Europe, the limit is 25%. The Nedcor-Standard
merged bank would hold 37% of total banking deposits. As luck would have it,
the hostility of this merger added to the systemic risks, where Standard's
managers had threatened a mass exodus if Nedcor took over. "If we all
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walked out the day they walked in, the systemic risks would be huge," said
one Standard executive.
In rejecting a similar transaction, the Canadian regulatory authorities
concluded that too few banks would lead to too much concentration, where
the four large domestic clearing banks will be reduced to three. Therefore
approval of the Standard/Nedcor bank and the creation of an enlarged entity
could leave the remaining two large competitors with no option but to merge
as well, and their combined market shares could be unsustainably high, a
reason advanced by Canada for declining similar merger proposals. What's
more, the dependence of South Africa on one bank through the
Standard/Nedcor combination that would invariably become the dominant
counter-party across all banking products could threaten the South African
economy, with disastrous consequences. Systemic risks would also increase
if Nedcor held less than 100% of Standard. It was imperative therefore that
Nedcor guaranteed its acquisition of 100% of Standard or nothing, as it would
be impossible to achieve the desired benefits if minority shareholders
remained within Standard bank.
Another compelling argument against this bank merger was the extremely
high implementation risks, especially for South Africa, where skills and
management competence were in dire short supply. Nedcor was, after all
much smaller than Standard, and could not hope to manage a merged entity
on their own.
3.10.9 Avoidable job losses would result
Part of Nedcor's plan to streamline the merged company was through
massive layoffs. Standard had argued that these unemployment and social
costs were unnecessary, particularly since both banks were already healthy.
A three-year profit history of Standard bank is enclosed hereunder to
emphasise this fact. The year on year growth in post tax income of 30% in
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2000 (19% 1n 1999) supports this assertion, so is the operating profit of R4,
522bn in 2000 (R3, 496bn in 1999) as noted in table 3.10 hereunder.
Table 3.10: Comparative income statement13
R'OOO 2000 1999 1998
Interest income 20,654 21,255 21,888
Interest expense 13,465 14,524 15,916
Net interest income before provisions for credit
losses 7,189 6,731 5,972
Provisions for credit losses 1,406 1,527 1,804
Net interest income 5,783 5,204 4,168
Non-interest income 7,201 6,352 5,225
Total income 12,984 11,556 9,393
Operating expenses 8,462 8,060 6,946
Operating profit 4,522 3,496 2,447
Income from associated undertakings 16 10 295
Exceptional items (37) (13) (17)
Income before taxation 4,501 3,493 2,725
Taxation 1,299 1,035 665
Income after taxation 3,202 2,458 2,060
Source: Standard Bank's published annual financial statements 2002
Contrary to Nedcor's estimates, the merger would crowd out approximately
10 000 to 15 000 permanent jobs probably within 12-months. A majority
thereof would have been disproportionately Black, given the occupation
sectors that were likely to become redundant from the banks' overlapping
branch networks, and primarily at the clerical and branch levels. Therefore to
even suggest that natural attrition would resolve the endemic problem of job
losses was facile and cynical, considering Nedcor's cost cutting imperative,
and its estimate was likely to be understated. This merged entity would thus
upset the amicable industrial relations climate that had prevailed until then in
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the sector, resulting in the likelihood of the merged entity becoming a less
attractive employer.
3.10.10 Implementation and IT risks
The scale of integration was daunting and its completion was projected to
take up to six years, which protracted timeframe could further increase
business risks. Standard contended that integrating the two banks' IT systems
was a major barrier to reaping the anticipated synergies. It further argued that
Nedcor had no experience of integrating IT systems on such a large scale,
and thus estimated that it would take 100 years of IT labour to integrate the
systems of the two banks. Standard also cited Lloyds TSB in the United
Kingdom as an entity that still maintained separate systems four years after its
merger due to the difficulty and high integration costs. ABSA too, had
experienced immense problems integrating its IT systems in the seven years'
since it was formed.
3.10.11 Public interest issues
Nedcor's sudden interest in the under banked mass markets was considered
inconsistent with its past, and therefore viewed as expedient. The merger was
projected to result in the permanent removal of at least 10 000 jobs from two
highly profitable companies.
3.10.12 Consequences of approving a hostile bid
Standard therefore argued as articulated above that the systemic risks would
be exceptionally high. The substantial integration risks exacerbated by the
consequent hostility, and the lack of a common vision would result in the
departure of key Standard management, especially at Standard Corporate
and Merchant Bank (SCMB). Moreover, Standard's mass-market strategy
would be jeopardised by a competitor with no appetite or experience in this
regard.
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Whilst Standard's board felt Nedcor had underestimated the merger risks and
overstated its benefits, Standard did not initially dispute the logic of Nedcor's
arguments.29 The board's two main objections to Nedcor's proposal were that:
~ Nedcor's offer price was too low. Standard preferred a premium of no less
than one Nedcor share for 4.75 Standard shares (a 26% premium), as
they felt that Standard's share price was trading at its lowest, and did not
reflect its true value. According to one analyst, a premium of around 30%
would have been appropriate in a merger of this kind.
~ During Nedcor's presentation to Standard's board, Nedcor management
were alleged to have stated that both banks had their strengths, Standard
was its brand, and Nedcor was its management. So Standard's executive
board members felt disparaged, and thereafter Standard's top
management commented that had Nedcor demonstrated just a little
courtesy and a higher offer price, Standard's board would have had great
difficulty in resisting their initiative.
~ In the meantime, financial markets wreaked havoc on Standard bank
shares, as abnormal expectations peaked in anticipation of a successful
conclusion of this transaction in Nedcor's favour. Whereas Standard was
alleged to have rarely talked to investors, Nedcor was regarded as a bank
with a vision and a good merger story. In addition, they generally enjoyed
friendly relations with finance and investment analysts, and had a good
public relations department.
As luck would have it, during December 1999 and early 2000, the tide of
public and expert opinion started to shift against Nedcor. More analysts
expressed doubts about the benefits of the merger, and Standard itself
seemed like a rejuvenated bank as a result of its efforts to fend off Nedcor.
Even some of Nedcor's shareholders were growing anxious that the hostile
nature of the bid would hurt the performance of the merged bank, particularly
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if talented Standard managers were to quit rather than work for Nedcor.
Conversely, Nedcor maintained its confidence that the merger would go
through, but within Standard, a public relations campaign was hardly
necessary. Workers were fired up by what they saw as the Nedcor threat.
Some Standard branch employees wore shirts to work that had the following
message "Hands off our bank" and "fight The Greens," green being Nedcor's
corporate colour.
Besides media advertisements, the powerful South African Society for Bank
Officials (SASBO), a peculiarly stable white-collar union, and one of the
nation's oldest, buoyed Standard's offensive. At the time, SASBO already had
a close relationship with Standard, representing two-thirds of its staff and even
some managers, while Nedcor's workers had their own company union and
thus little contact with SASBO. Therefore Standard had little difficulty gaining
the staunch support of the union because of the potential post-merger job
losses.
3.11 Standard's exoneration29
On June 21 2000, the Minister of Finance announced his decision to reject the
merger outright. In so doing, he cited a multitude of mitigating and aggravating
factors. But before making this decision, the Minister had previously received
reports from both the Competition Commission and the Registrar of Banks,
which unanimously recommended against the merger. The Ministry of
Finance, by contrast, was thought to be leaning towards Nedcor. For one
thing, Nedcor's chairman Chris Liebenberg was the former Minister of
Finance. He was thus considered to be still in close contact with his successor
in the Ministry, Trevor Manuel, who would ultimately rule on the case.
Secondly, South Africa's Registrar of Banks Christo Wiese had indicated
earlier that he was inclined to let the merger proceed. Registrar Wiese was a
pivotal figure, because he was charged with considering potential systemic
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risks to the banking industry anslng from the merger. The Registrar and
Competition Commission's reports formed the foremost reliable evidence that
would inform Minister Manuel's decision. In his conclusion, the Minister had to
simultaneously consider the health of the banking industry, the nation's
economy, and the broader social context, which in some ways was unique
because of South Africa's apartheid past, but was in other ways typical of an
emerging market.
Table 3.11: Decision circumstances
Mitigating circumstances
The possibility that much needed consolidation in the
rest of the banking system would be jeopardised.3D
The Registrar was concerned that his
recommendation would send wrong signal to the
global and local banking communities. He had to
make a call in the matter though, and subsequently
recommended against the merger, even though he
had been initially inclined to approve it. For him, the
decision was "51-49," indicating that it could have
easily gone the other way.
The commissions concerns about the proposed
merger related to retail banking services for individual
and small businesses. Within the corporate
investment and merchant banking sector, the
commission found reasonable grounds to believe the
transaction "would not substantially prevent or lessen
competition."
Aggravating circumstances38
The Registrar was compelled to weigh the
social costs against the potential benefits of
the merger.
The increased level of moral hazard for the
state if the merged bank became too big or
failed.
The probably high social costs if there were
problems in the implementation of the merger,
and concerns that Standard's management
would resign before Nedcor was ready to take
over.
The legal problem for the Competition
Commission was that the Competition Act and
the Banks Act appeared to contradict one
another. The Competition Act states
unequivocally that regulated industries were
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not subject to competition law. This rationale
was that certain utilities such as Eskom were
legal monopolies, and thus couldn't be faulted
for engaging in monopolistic or uncompetitive
behaviour. Because banking was technically a
regulated industry, it too appeared to fall
outside the jurisdiction of the Competition
Commission. The Banks Act, on the other
hand required that the Commission be
consulted before any bank merger was
approved, implying that anti-competitive
practices were indeed a potential problem
within the industry.
The Competition Commission had decided
that: "The proposed transaction should be
prohibited on the grounds that it will have
significant social costs, primarily abuse of
market power in the retail banking market and
potential job losses, which would represent a
net loss to society. The Competition
Commission so recommended that the
Nedcor bid for Standard be prohibited, and
released their report which was highly critical
of Nedcor's expansion programme.
In the report, the commission argued that a
merger would have resulted in increases in
the prices of products and services in retail
banking, a tightening of conditions for
obtaining finance, a lowering of product and
service quality, and a lack of product
innovation. The negative impact thereof would
be high customer switching costs from one
bank to another.
Additionally, the report referred to Nedcor's
current pricing strategy and pointed out that
"in terms of bank charges, Nedcor's were the
highest of the four major retail banks." While
all South African banks had focused on
containing their cost-to-income ratios, Nedcor
stood out as having the most desirable ratio
69
among the first tier banks. One of the
methods used to achieve this feat was
through concentrating on the sector of the
market it viewed as the "right client." It was
well known that in its attempts to find the
"right client", Nedcor had closed 800 000
accounts in the retail personal banking sector,




Extracted from unpublished confidential reports to the Minister of Finance by
the Registrar of Banks and the Competition Commission; completed 2000.
The consequences
Jacko Maree, Standard Bank's CEO and his team had spent eight months
and R77 million repelling Nedcor's unsolicited advances. Standard's advisers
were J.P. Morgan and Deutsche Bank. The former got paid the same rate
regardless of the outcome, while the latter got paid if the deal ended in a
board-recommended outcome. On the other hand, Nedcor's adviser was
Warburg Dillon Read, which stood to earn a large fee if the merger took place.
After the Minister's announcement rejecting the merger, Nedcor was quiet
about whether it would approach other banks with merger proposals although
they had previously admitted that ABSA was their second choice.31 Many
stakeholders speculated that the Minister's decision effectively outlawed all
mergers among the big four banks. However, both the Competition
Commission and the Registrar of Banks indicated that mergers with a failing
bank would face less opposition. On the other hand, Standard was unlikely to
pursue any major bank acquisitions within South Africa, given the nature of its
merger defence.
A few months later and after the Minister's decision was published, the credit
rating agency Duff and Phelps reaffirmed the short-term domestic rating of
both Standard and Nedcor banks at 01 +.32 This rating meant that the banks
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had the highest certainty of timely repayment, and that their short-term
liquidity was considered outstanding. This role of industry confidence
galvanised the bank's to consolidate internally after this hostility, and devoted
their efforts towards strengthening their competitive positions.
3.12 Summary: Chapter 3
In this chapter I started with the goal of understanding the possible strategic
synergies that could have enhanced or inhibited the success of this proposed
merger. What emerged during my research was that both banks were not
diametrically opposed to the merger proposal, but rather, Standard's major
concerns revolved around the offer price, which was at variance with the
inherent and potential value of Standard bank. So were the systemic
integration risks, which were considered too high. However, Nedcor's
perceived arrogance was the pinnacle of all concerns raised against the
merger.
A brief socio, economic and political history of the country was cited, for
purposes of setting the context in which both banks were established and
eventually plied their trade. This investigation and discussion was followed by
a synopsis of the general banking industry, and the formation of both
Standard and Nedcor banks. Of great significance was that both banks were
founded in the 1800's, within a 26-year interval. Both institutions were
successful a century later, and due to prevailing socio-economic and political
circumstances, were now entangled in an industry consolidation that was
poised to destroy one or both of them. They competed in the same markets,
yet through different business strategies. Whereas Standard focussed on
organic growth, low margin high volume business, Nedcor chose growth by
acquisition, low volume high margin business. Nedcor saw itself as a
technological innovator that provided diversified financial services, whilst
Standard viewed itself as a diversified global provider of fUll spectrum
banking, with African Roots and Global Reach. These diverse strategies
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presented conflicting execution tactics, and presented immense resource and
profit implications. In addition, political pressure increased subsequent to the
democratisation of South Africa, which created massive consternation for
Nedcor, who were vulnerable due to their disproportionately low
representation in serving poor Black customers. It emerged later that this was
Nedcor's underlying reason amongst others to seek a partner with the correct
representation credentials, in order to mitigate against such political and
reputation risks
The section covering SADC markets indicated that five South African banks
migrated almost simultaneously therein, and again, Nedcor and Standard
competed through the same channels as in South Africa. However, the
detailed merger arguments, with Nedcor focussing on the losses suffered by
Standard, its poor management quality, criticism of Standard's international
and continental growth strategies, and comparatively high operating costs
received undue prominence. In addition, Nedcor had believed that only the
Minister of Finance had jurisdiction over the matter. This opinion had been
obtained from Michael Katz, a highly regarded lawyer who was also Nedcor's
in-house legal counsel, and headed their legal team. In his opinion, he was
adamant that Nedcor had correctly interpreted the law, and was vindicated in
February 2000 when the high court ruled that the Finance Minister was solely
responsible for approving the merger, and that the Competition Commission's
role was purely advisory.
As a result of this ruling, the momentum once more shifted towards Nedcor,
because the Competition Commission had been considered the body most
likely to reject the deal. It then transpired that the only meaningful intervention
by the Commission could have arisen if the combined market share of the
merged entity exceeded 35%, or if the merger substantially reduced
competition, in which case, the commission could have blocked the merger.
The commission also weighed such social factors as potential job losses, and
the negative effect on Black Economic Empowerment. The Commission then
ruled that the proposed merger would not prevent or lessen competition
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substantially, since both financial intermediaries conducted their business in
the financial services industry, which was not limited to the business of retail
banking only. Part of this rationale was based on substantial public interest
grounds in that:
~ The merged entity would enhance the ability to provide credit to the under
banked mass market.
~ It could result in the creation of a regional bank with sufficient scale to
enhance trade across South Africa.
~ Contribute to the enhancement of SADC and continent wide banking,
resulting in sufficient Black Economic Empowerment opportunities. It is
against this background that Nedcor decided to implement its takeover
strategy.
Standard had based its principal arguments against the merger on public
interest issues and systemic risks, and drew parallels with examples of similar
proposed mergers that were rejected in both Canada and Australia. They also
argued against the potential strength of the merged bank, which could
destabilise the economy of South Africa's sovereignty, if it failed. Similarly, a
Standard/Nedcor merged bank would marginalise its competitors its
competitors to the point where they would have to merge in order to compete
on a similar footing. Again, if this merged institution succeeded, it would
potentially limit transactional banking to two mega competitors only.
The primary public interest issues related to massive job losses that would
arise as a consequence of the merger. An emerging but stable economy like
South Africa just could not afford the instability that would ensue as a result of
such mass unemployment due to staff retrenchments by the mega-bank.
Similarly, Nedcor's history in the under-serviced low-income sector was poor,
and received its deserved share of criticism from the Competition Commission
in their recommendations to the Minister. Therefore, it was unthinkable to
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even contemplate that the regulators would support such a dis-empowering
proposition of national significance, although the regulators reasons were not
necessarily aligned to those articulated in this summary.
Secondary reasons were offered as well. They included the lack of synergies
between the two institutions, probable denial of banking alternatives to the
South African consumers of financial services, the lack of a significant global
profile as a consequence of the merger, the poor history of failed bank
mergers, an inability to integrate two different information technology systems
and their associated costs. Finally, the hostility between the two banks was
just too serious to even contemplate a possible resolution in a merged entity.
When the Minister finally pronounced his verdict that prohibited the merger,
Standard's management were not surprised, but equally relieved. The
reasons promoted for this decision were based on technical issues, but were
also dominated by public interest and systematic risks. In the final analysis,
this experiment cost both institutions millions of Rand, and the lessons
learned are still reverberating throughout both organisations to this day.
In the next chapter, I will review the situation that led to the merger offer, and
both offensive and defensive strategies implemented by Standard bank to
avoid a recurrence thereof.
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CHAPTER 4
4. Results (obseNations and findings)
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains an evaluation of all information contained in the
preceding chapters, where the strategy development and evaluation
processes were adopted as analytical tools. This information will thus be used
to assess Nedcor's motivation to launch a hostile takeover bid for a competitor
that was significantly larger, technological and financially superior to it. In turn,
Standard's defensive strategies will be scrutinised, in order to identify any
restrictive actions (offensive and defensive) in strategy formulation and
execution. Finally, an investigation into the socio-cultural, economic, and
political context that existed during the takeover bid, particularly within the
financial sector will be applied in the conclusion. In so doing, answers will be
sought to the following questions:
~ Why did this proposal deteriorate into a trial by the media, and followed by
costly legal suits, which necessitated political inteNention for its ultimate
resolution? Was political intermediation avoidable? Were there no
alternative strategic options within reach to resolve this impasse?
~ Evaluate both institutional responses to the final ruling, particularly
Standard's defensive strategy, its long-term sustainability, and lessons
learnt to avert another hostile takeover bid.
4.2 ObseNations
On 17 November 2000, Standard's board voted to recommend that its
shareholders reject the Nedcor offer. They believed that Nedcor was
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attempting to acquire control of Standard bank without due compensation to
its shareholders. On the other hand, Nedcor was running out of road and
seeking to benefit from Standard's investments. This running out of road
charge was based on Standard's belief that Nedcor had achieved its recent
success by cutting costs rather than investing in new potential sources of
revenue growth.
Any bank take-over bid has to cross the regulatory hurdles, since banking is a
regulated business enterprise. Although it is primarily a question for investors
to decide, there are also public interest questions of major importance at
stake, and on these, the regulators must rule. Having said that, how do you
structure such a bid? What is the order in which you go? Do you seek
regulatory approval first and then submit the bid to the investors, or do you do
it the other way around? Either way would be feasible.
What Nedcor elected to do however, was to go for regulatory approval first.
They presumably chose this route believing that they would obtain a speedy
approval on the basis of their signals. Of paramount importance was that
Nedcor had initiated the first move, and therefore set the negotiating agenda.
In spite thereof, they were disappointed because they could not get a quick
approval from the Minister of Finance in terms of the Banks Act. Furthermore,
they assumed that the Banks Act preceded the Competition authorities,
relying on section 3(1 )(d), an exemption clause in the Competition Act. This
paragraph thus responds to the question posed in paragraph 4.1 earlier. The
regulatory framework in which the banks operate unfortunately leads to
political intervention in the event of a deadlock between to merging
institutions. Therefore, the Banks Act and the South African Reserve Bank
Act converge on this point, and leave no other alternative, outside of a
consensual merger.
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Again, as articulated in paragraph 3.3 above, there were basically two sets of
issues, commercial23 and public interest issues24• On the commercial issue,
Nedcor were offering a share exchange with no cash component, and the
share exchange was purported to be market related. As Standard's share
rating lagged Nedcor's at the time the first proposal was made, the anticipated
share distribution ratio started at about:
~ 6,3 Standard shares for one Nedcor share.
~ When the bid, or more correctly the intention to make a bid was
announced on 15 November 1999, Nedcor proposed one Nedcor share for
5,5 Standard shares, provided that this could be improved to
~ 5,25 Standard shares if the Standard board went along with the proposal
for the merger.
~ Standard's response was to draw the line at 4,75 Standard shares for each
Nedcor share, asserting that position as the starting point at which the
board could consider any proposal. Standard stated that Nedcor had to
pay a premium over the market price, and besides that, there had to be a
full cash option to allow investors to exit if they did not want to bear the risk
of the merger not succeeding. Standard also emphasised that the inherent
risks of a hostile takeover bid were enormous, and that such combinations
rarely succeeded as the target company's management would by and
large be likely to walk out.
~ During the nine months while the regulatory stage of the bid was in
progress, the market traded the two shares at about 5,3 Standard shares
to each Nedcor share. There was speculation in the financial media that
Nedcor would mount a knockout bid of 5:1, but this never materialised.
Ultimately, the public interest issues determined the debate, and in making
his ruling, Minister Trevor Manuel ruled in favour of and supported the
main arguments levelled by Standard against the bid. These main
arguments were as follows:
23
24
These were price and term specifics.
These were issues that affected investors, customers, and banking officials.
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4.2.1 The financial services industry
Standard certainly focused much attention on the dominant position that
Old Mutual would have created for itself had the merger succeeded. It was
not only banking industry questions that were involved, but also insurance
industry questions, and the financial services industry as a whole.
4.2.2 Corporate globalisation strategy
Nedcor had argued for creating a national banking champion, and
Standard countered that whereas Standard on its own was ranked
somewhere around 212 amongst international banks, the combined entity
would only be ranked at about 144, hardly a quantum leap. Further, was it
the correct strategy to fight competition from the foreign banks by ganging
up against them? Would it not be more advantageous to join forces with
some of them and to externalise rather than internalise any potential
threats?
4.2.3 International experience
Standard further argued that the four pillar policy consciously adopted in
Australia and in effect applied in Canada was a sound one, and also
pointed to the fact that although a regional Scottish bank had been allowed
to take over Natwest in England, it was most unlikely that any of the four
major clearing banks in England could merge with each other. In addition,
the proposed merger between Deutsche Bank and Dresner Bank in
Germany, which was mooted but later failed to materialise, would have




This was basically the sphere for investigation by the Registrar of Banks.
How would the proposed merger affect the stability of the South African
banking system? On the face of it, a combination of two already strong
institutions should result in an even stronger entity. The Registrar, Christo
Wiese unfortunately remarked at the outset, that his decision to approve
such a transaction should be a "no-brainer." But on further reflection,
perhaps the answer was not so simple. What if the merger failed because
of a management walkout from the target bank as a result of the hostility?
This would create tremendous pressure on the national economic system,
with possible catastrophic results. On the other hand, what if the merger
succeeded and surpassed all reasonable expectations? The combined
entity would be very powerful and might even usurp the very sovereignty of
the Reserve Bank. Dr. Iraj Abedian, Standard bank's Group Chief
Economist, introduced this subtle argument into the equation.
4.2.5 Competition issues
If the number of the four major banks were reduced to three, and each of
the three were of roughly the same size that would have been one matter.
But if any two of the four major banks amalgamated and created an entity
that was twice the size of the remaining two, an imbalance would emerge.
Therefore, considering the diverse product portfolios that would be
marketed by this new giant, one could safely conclude that in most
instances, the level of concentration would exceed 50%, and in some
cases 55% of the market, whereas the international benchmark was more
like 35%, beyond which threshold the regulators were unlikely to allow a
merger. Besides, the challenge posed by such a merger to the remaining
two institutions would most likely force them into a marriage as well. This
incidence would effectively reduce the number of competitor banks from
four to two, as might have happened in Canada. These factors were
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thoroughly considered by the Competition Commission in making their
decision.
4.2.6 Job losses
This was an obvious weakness in Nedcor's proposal, and to aggravate
matters, their Human Resources Director mismanaged his relations with
SASBO in his public statements, which were perceived as lacking in
empathy. In response to his unpopular statements, SASBO required very
little encouragement to instigate a successful publicity campaign against
Nedcor and the merger.
4.2.7 Information technology (IT).
The two banks operated from different IT platforms, which would need
integration to accomplish the proposed cost reductions. Standard's IT
experts calculated that it would have needed every computer programmer
in the country to work on the project for more than two years to achieve
this, and even then, unforeseen delays could have occurred, as was the
case with ABSA's merger process.
4.2.8 The mass market proposition
Standard bank made great capital out of its thrust into the mass market
through the E-plan product, and later, the joint venture announced with
African Bank. By contrast, Nedcor had chosen to shrink the SA Perm by
shedding customers at a great rate, in order to become an up market,
elitist bank, and thereby achieve its illustrious cost reduction programme.
Standard therefore argued convincingly that the merger proposals would
not be beneficial to either of the two banks, the banking industry in
general, or to the country as a whole.
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4.2.9 Potential conflict of interest
At the beginning of June 2000, when the approval for the bid was still
under consideration, the media reported that Nedcor's Chairman and CEO
had been to Nedcor's game lodge in the Limpopo Province. They were
spotted viewing game, and in the company of the Finance Minister and the
Reserve Bank Governor. This accusation not only compromised their
impartiality, but also created an impression of grave conflict of interest and
poor judgement on their part, considering that they would later adjudicate
this proposed merger.
4.3 Standard's intelligence networks
Standard was said to have invoked its own effective networking capacity
through highly efficient means of reaching the decision makers. Their Group
Chief Economist, a former professor at the University of Cape Town had
previously undertaken research and consulted to the Ministry of Finance,
particularly on evolving the GEAR Policy. He had then developed
professional relationships with the Director-General, Ms. Maria Ramos. In
addition, Saki Macozoma, Standard's Deputy Chairman was a personal
friend of the Deputy Minister of Finance. Hence, when Standard were
required to present orally to the Finance Ministry, they harnessed the talent
of Tesula Mohindra of J P Morgan Bank, who according to rumours, and
beside being brilliant, was also very attractive and a power dresser.
Conversely, Nedcor had the benefit of at least a year's head start before
executing their acquisitive strategy but were constrained to changing their
public relations company twice during the course of the battle. Standard also
initiated a legal battle to erect regulatory obstacles to the merger. The legal
dispute was over which regulators had jurisdiction to approve the deal.
Standard contended that the merger required the approval of the Minister of
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Finance as well as separate approval by the Competition Commission, a
new and untested body set up under the Competition Act of 1998.
Although Standard started from a long way behind, their public relations
outfit excelled. Therefore Standard's strategic engagement and widespread
communication entailed the proliferation of free and intense debate from all
affected disciplines, directed by a seasoned campaigner with the necessary
intellectual wherewithal. By contrast, Nedcor seemed to rely on the
admittedly considerable skills of their three key leaders25 , the Chairman,
CEO, Executive Director and Head of their legal department. Unfortunately,
they were collectively unavailable to provide the requisite high-level
economic input where it mattered, and therefore Standard won the war not
at the top level where they seemed to be directing themselves, but at the
lower levels through the people who were charged with making vital
recommendations.
4.4 SWOT analysis
Table 4.1: SWOT analysis
Strengths
~ Clearly defined and diversified business
strategy
~ Strong balance sheet and sustainable
profits
~ Well established global delivery network,
and largest presence in Africa
~ Strong history and corporate culture
~ Possesses cutting edge technologies,
and innovative wholesale product range
~ Respected and best performing
wholesale bank (SCMB)
~ Sound relations with the labour
organ isations
~ Successful market segmentation
strategy, and enviable low cost delivery
channel
~ Dedicated multidisciplinary teams
~ Strong social commitment
Weaknesses
~ Lack of strategic focus
~ Thin dispersal of management capability
~ Heavy losses suffered
~ Lethargic management
~ Low value-high volume strategy
~ Poor communication with stakeholders
~ Higher input costs above industry norms
25
Chairman Chris Liebenberg; Chief Executive Officer; Richard Laubscher, Executive
Director and Head of their legal department; Michael Katz.
Opportunities
~ Leverage off delivery infrastructure both
locally and abroad
~ Reduce input costs below industry norm
~ Develop and recruit a larger base of
competent executive management
~ Outsource communications function to
external experts
4.4.1 Response to strengths
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Threats
~ Forays into local markets and customer
base by global banks
~ Exogenous market forces
Contrary to market perceptions, Standard had evolved a comprehensive
business strategy, and Nedcor were well aware thereof. It is partly this reality,
which motivated Nedcor to seek a merger with Standard bank, and not
consider another full spectrum competitor bank. In terms of recurring
profitability and strong local and foreign reserves, Standard's performance
was regarded as the industry benchmark, and the effectiveness of its
wholesale bank and product innovation, made it the envy of its competitors.
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 graphically represented Standard's international and SADC
representation. This investment in physical infrastructure is the most
comprehensive of all South African banks. Standard were thus able to
leverage off this investment, and these opportunities were evident in the profit
contribution, particularly of the global segment.
During this merger process, Standard's sound labour relations record became
handy, when SASBO supported Standard's defence and job security
arguments. Not only did this support fortify Standard's position, it also
exposed Nedcor's poor judgement in this matter. Finally, Standard had
leveraged successfully from their alliance with African Bank, but also invested
heavily on the E-Plan product. These delivery mechanisms presented
Standard with immense capacity to penetrate and service the under-banked,
lower end market segment. Again, during their defence, they exploited to
good effect the demonstrable commitment to this market. On the other hand,
Nedcor had unilaterally closed 800 000 accounts belonging to this market,
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hence their offer to maximise banking benefits to the under-banked
communities in their offer was baulked at.
4.4.2 Response to weaknesses 33
Nedcor had argued that Standard's management were lethargic and inept.
This was verified by Standard's pursuance of a global leadership strategy, at
the expense of consolidating their domestic and African operations. Hence,
the losses incurred in Russia, and other local exposures were allegedly a
direct consequence of this lack of focus. These management weaknesses
were attributed to the thin management dispersal to a wide focus area26 , and
high input cost structures. Furthermore, their under-banked strategy, coupled
with the low value-high volume strategy were regarded as a signal of bad
strategic formulation, that also contributed to the relatively higher than normal
input costs27 . Standard agreed with the above sentiments, but argued that the
context was different, as would be explained in paragraph 4.5 below.
4.4.3 Response to opportunities
Standard considered both its strengths and weaknesses as the springboard
from which to launch its future business efficiencies. Standard argued that
they held sufficient internal resources, which were supported by a well-
established global branch delivery network and intellectual capacity, a
respected merchant bank that is able to product innovate, considering
Standard's critical mass and clearly segmented customer base. In the end,
Standard offered that it's above average input costs will reduce concomitantly;
given new markets opening and business growth, and the extra capacity will




Profit contribution by Stanbic Africa 10%, and Standard International 15%. Source:
Published Standard bank interim results June 2000.
Cost to income ratio reduced from 60% - 58% in 2001
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4.4.4 Response to threats
Market threats were considered external evolutions, the biggest being foreign
banks coming into the South African market, and local financial market
players migrating, or diversifying into mainstream banking. However,
Standard felt that they were not overly exposed to these threats, because they
were a vertically integrated business entity, with a well-diversified portfolio.
Therefore, any form of market turbulence could be mediated using its internal
capacity and experience.
4.5 Standard bank's performance against objectives
What was informative and emerged from the SWOT analysis are Standard
bank's objectives, their comparative strengths to Nedcor, and Standard's
accomplishment. In all five objectives, the results are quite impressive, as
illustrated in table 4.2 hereunder.
Table 4.2: After the skirmish...how they shape up
Standard Nedcor
Earnings +26% to R1, 646bn +27% to R1, 23bn
Assets +9,2% to R261.6bn +4% to R131 , 9bn
Advances +4,3% to R119, 2bn +5,2% to R105, 3bn
ROE 22,1% (20,2%) 24,2% (20,6%)
Cost -to-income-ratio 60,3% (61,4%) 52,1% (54,1%)
Source: Finance Week; 25/8/2000; "Stanbic back in the game."
85
~ Objective one was to maintain a +20% growth target, and Standard
achieved compounded year on year growth of 22%. These results were
published in their financial statements for the year ending 31 December
2002, and analysed in table 3.10, where operating income grew by 29%
2000 (43% in 1999) to R4, 522bn (R3, 496bn 1999). However, Nedcor
achieved a phenomenal 27% growth in earnings immediately after the
merger, with standard following at 26%, as noted in table 4.2 above. These
results substantiate Standard's sustainable growth assertion, as confirmed
by the sterling asset and ROE performances in table 4.2 above.
~ Objective two was to reduce operating costs. Standard achieved a 1,1 %
reduction in their cost structures as reported in table 4,2, but were beaten
by Nedcor who achieved a 2% reduction in the same costs.
~ Objective three was to establish a niche investment bank in London. This
office was established in 1994, and by 1999 was contributing 15% of
Standard Bank's annual before tax profits.
~ Objective four was to expand into the rest of Africa. It was reported in
Standard bank's published annual financial statements for 2002 that
Standard achieved the largest representation in Sub-Saharan Africa,
relative to its competitors. Standard bank now boasts of a physical retail
branch network that spans 17-African countries, excluding its South
African operations. This infrastructure also supports Standard's wholesale
and institutional operations in those countries.
~ Finally, objective five was to seek out Iow-income customers, and provide
them with essential banking and financial solutions. Standard established
a joint venture with African Bank, a third tier bank that specialised in the
lower income markets. The purpose of this alliance was to cooperate at
both the upper and lower end of the personal markets. Standard would use
African banks expertise to penetrate the lower end of the market, while
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transferring the requisite capacity to African bank, so they could enter and
service the upper end of the personal market as well.34
In addition, Standard had rolled out its Auto-E network, targeting the lower
market segments with special purpose yet simply presented banking
solutions. This approach became the darling of the lower market segments
because of its innovation, and was regarded as the benchmark for servicing
this market successfully. Numerous foreign government's including the
United Nations sent emissaries to Standard, in order to explore avenues for
transferring this model to other third world countries. Through this solution,
Standard achieved the highest global market penetration, and also became
the envy of its competitors.
4.6 Summary: Chapter 4
Table 4.3: Characterisation of the relative strengths of each bank
Nedcor's strategy Standard strategy
~ Focus on getting core business right ~ Revenue-driven strategy of investment
~ Low risk appetite for growth
~ Process improvements to lower costs ~ Expansion of international presence
~ Utilising leading edge technology ~ Higher risk appetite (domestic and
~ Working with top-class partners in new internationally)
markets ~ Largest banking group by profit, capital
~ Focus on high profit customers and asset
~ Low-cost base driven by narrow ~ Broadest product and customer reach
business focus ~ Balancing growth, costs and business
~ Domestic bank diversity
~ High technology profile, but narrower ~ Diverse sources of earning
on-the- ground delivery ~ Recognised leader in banking and allied
~ Sudden interest in mass market technology
expedient ~ Dominant in the mass market
~ NIB lower rated than Nedcor and trading ~ The leading SA corporate and merchant
at a substantial discount to offer price bank
~ No meaningful African presence ~ Strongest African presence
~ No emerging market international ~ International emerging markets franchise
presence building on African expertise
~ No bancassurance model ~ Functioning profitable bancassurance
~ A successful niche bank relationship with Liberty
~ An acute awareness of South Africa's
bankinq needs
Source: Adapted from internal Standard bank documents
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Banks in general are a national asset that wants to be good corporate
citizens, and are desperately keen to lend money and grow their advances.
The principal role of banks is to become custodians of the nation's savings,
which are invested in the form of capital and deposits. These savings are
accumulated from the economic endeavours of ordinary citizens in the form of
pension funds, insurance policies and other savings products. Individuals,
companies, and institutions all invest their savings with commercial banks that
then on-lend these savings in the form of capital and deposits in the market.
Table 4.3 thus summarised the competitive strategies of both banks as
discussed in previous chapters. This comparative representation confirms
their strategic diversity, a situation that undermined the proposed merger. It
also held tremendous competitive potential, had the merger been
consummated. Therefore, a collision of strategy is not necessarily a bad
execution, particularly when there is rational and effective strategic
management to mediate disputes.






The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate both institutional responses to the
final ruling, and in particular Standard's defensive strategy as implemented, its
sustainability in the long-term, and lessons learned to avert a similar hostile
takeover bid from recurring. I will enquire into the strategic and management
interventions that have since been implemented to fortify Standard's
competitiveness. This investigation will conclude by making certain industry
specific recommendations, which I trust could assist other organisations that
may contemplate hostile mergers, or avoid becoming potential takeover
targets.
5.2 The arguments reviewed
It had transpired that the adjudicating protagonists in this merger were
unanimous on the potential benefits of a friendly merger between Standard
and Nedcor. They collectively agreed with the proposed merits thereof, and
further submitted that a merger of these institutions made both business and
strategic sense. However, they were also unanimous in rejecting the
execution plan and tactical approaches employed by Nedcor. In particular,
they referred to Nedcor's alienating practices, antagonism, covert arrogance
towards Standard, and the potential threats to the banking sector's labour
force, which sector had until then been relatively stable, without the
adversarial employer/employee tensions that characterised other industry
sectors. It was enlightening to compare the two banks' different focus areas,
as profiled in table 1.1 and 4.3 respectively. This diversity emphasised the
potentially formidable competitive synergies that would have arisen had these
two entities concluded merger successfully, given their strengths in different
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target markets, strategic focus and execution. These were but some of the
strategic and tactical errors committed by Nedcor, which contributed to their
loss of a well-orchestrated merger proposition that could have succeeded, had
it been managed with circumspection.
After the rejection of the initial merger offer, Nedcor still seemed to have the
upper hand as it decided to bypass Standard's board, and elected to directly
approach Standard's shareholders with a 9% premium offer of one Nedcor
share for every 5.5 Standard shares. At the time, Nedcor declared that it had
already secured the support of 36% of Standard's shareholders (including
Nedcor's parent Old Mutual, which also held a 21 % stake in Standard).
Nedcor persistently persuaded Standard's shareholders to sign irrevocable
letters of support for its bid, in order to obtain the 50.1 % it needed, further
creating a false impression that it had secured written commitments from
shareholders owning 48% of the banking group.
If Nedcor were to secure the desired support of 50.1 % of Standard's
shareholders, it could hire a new board, and thus force the sale of the roughly
20% of shares held within the Standard and Liberty group, thereby ultimately
securing 100% control of the company. Hence Nedcor tried to coerce
Standard's board by stipulating that the offer ratio would be improved to a
14% premium, if only the board recommended the merger to its shareholders.
While Nedcor maintained that the new bid was friendly, it had become to all
intents and purposes a hostile one to both outside observers, as well as to
Standard management. Nedcor had always insisted that the primary objective
of the merger was to realise:
~ Long term financial stability and soundness of the sector, maintain its
capacity to finance economic growth, and facilitate domestic and
international commerce.
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~ Substantial enhancements of the sector's ability to provide appropriate and
effective access to financial services for a greater segment of the
population, and
~ Promote diverse organisational cultures to cater for a wide range of
customers, and reflect the principles of completeness. As a consequence,
the financial sector will invest in human resource development across the
full compendium of essential skills, with special emphasis on increasing
the participation of Black people in skilled, strategic, and operational
leadership of the sector, and would:
• Establish programs in the secondary education sector, through
South African student support programs, including bursaries and
scholarships that were oriented towards hard sciences, and thus
promote the sector at both secondary and tertiary education
levels.
• Establish more undergraduate and postgraduate diplomas and
degrees in financial services, in partnership with institutions of
higher learning.
• Support the development of customer and community financial
education programs, savings, and financial literacy campaigns,
again in partnership with communities and co-operative
institutions.
• Become more efficient in the delivery of financial services, which
would promote the accumulation of savings that would be
directed towards developmental causes.
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5.3 Nedcor's haughtiness backfires
In pursuit of merger proposals after Nedcor's initial offer to Standard bank,
Nedcor failed to substantiate their case with essential documentation to the
Competition Commission. They had correctly opined that the Commission was
powerless in this matter. As a result, the Commission relied heavily on
Standard's more comprehensive submissions. One Commissioner
commented that if the two banks had agreed to the merger, and then
collectively approached the Commission, it would have been impossible for
the Commission to accumulate the necessary evidence to recommend against
the merger. Nonetheless the commission's report reflected crucial information
gaps, and seemed to have insufficient evidence to validate the supposed
merger benefits.
Sadly though, Nedcor's failure to motivate their case to the commission
inadvertently enhanced Standard's defensive strategy, which then influenced
the agenda by providing influential information that was in their favour. It
came as no surprise when the commission found that the proposed merger
would be highly anti-competitive, a conclusion that was based on invalidated
Standard Bank facts. The only argument of Nedcor's that might have reversed
the Commission's recommendation was Nedcor's claim that the merger would
allow it to better serve the under banked mass market. However, the
Commission was unconvinced anyway, because of Nedcor's previous track
record, and because Nedcor had not provided convincing details about how
specifically they intended to improve this customer service to under banked
communities.
In its report, the Commission further argued that a merger would have
resulted in increased product and service fees, a tightening of conditions for
obtaining finance, a lowering of product and service quality, and a lack of
product innovation in retail banking. The negative impact of this approach on a
wide range of customers would be aggravated by the high costs of switching
92
from one bank to another, as their report referred to Nedcor's current (then)
pricing policies, and inferred that in terms of bank charges, Nedcor's were the
highest of the four major retail banks. Furthermore, while South African banks
had focused on containing their cost-to-income ratios, Nedcor stood out as
having the most desirable ratio among the four major banks. This was
achieved through concentrating on the sector of the market it had viewed as
the "right client." Moreover, it was well known that in its attempts to find the
"right client", Nedcor had closed 800 000 accounts in the retail personal
banking sector, and re-assigned two million accounts over the past three
years.
The commission also referred to international trends towards consolidation in
the banking and financial services industry, but felt that the parallels were not
essentially persuasive. On the contrary, convincing arguments had been
presented where rivalry in the domestic market rather than national
dominance was more likely to foster internationally competitive business
practices. As a result, Old Mutual, which controlled Nedcor then lost an
incredible opportunity to rationalise its banking interests, which the merger
would have provided. Since their Standard bank investment was now clearly
not strategic, Old Mutual's policyholders probably needed no more than a
10% stake therein.
5.4 Standard's industrious defence
It was also rumoured that Nedcor wanted to reduce 10,000 to 15,000
employees from the 50,000 that would comprise the combined Nedcor
Standard banking group. As a result, bank officials were concerned that these
job cuts would most probably come from Standard bank, which was Africa's
largest bank by assets, rather than from Nedcor, the fourth largest. Standard
thus won the battle simply because of its meritorious and sustainable
employment practices that were aligned to their considerably sound labour
relations with SASBO. In the final analysis, Nedcor's proposal was a pretty
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poor one when subjected to proper scrutiny. This position thus emphasised
the importance of ensuring that influential stakeholder perceptions, particularly
those who could affect Standard's independent destiny were favourably
disposed towards them. This strategy execution necessitated the:
~ Selection of appropriate strategic and tactical methods to gain precious
opportunities for launching an efficient defence, both psychological and
legal.
~ Effective communication, which arose from changing leadership
structures, and the deployment of highly effective public relations
consultants. In essence, all of this required professionalism of the highest
order from a multi-disciplinary team. It also entailed the proliferation of free
and intense debate from all affected disciplines, directed by a seasoned
campaigner with the necessary intellectual wherewithal.
~ The effective deployment of an old bargaining and negotiating principle of
always having an alternative strategic plan, the proverbial "Plan B" was
effectively demonstrated in Standards' defence. It was apparent that
preparations for a hearing before the Competition Tribunal on the
substantive merits of the challenge could take about six weeks or more. In
preparation for a drawn out defence, Standard's advisors had thus
undertaken substantial research, and were in possession of relevant legal
opinions that were obtained from leading international counsel, academics,
and legal scholars. This defence was intensely validated by equally
competent South African legal experts, who resolved to invoke the SRP
Rules28 .
~ After a detailed examination of Nedcor's three-stage structured offer, it
was considered to have violated those rules, and in terms thereof, deemed
unlawful. Moreover, it was still possible to attack the lawfulness of effecting
28
The SRP rules require that a takeover offer should be made in the same fair terms to
all shareholders.
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a takeover through the scheme of arrangement process at appeal court
level, and there were substantial grounds for seeking to upset precedents
established by the high court. In effect, these alternatives culminated in a
full set of heads of argument, together with the final court papers, which
were ready for signing.
5.5 Standard's firm achievements
To confirm the effectiveness of Standard's defensive strategy, they
immediately instituted the following changes:
~ Nedcor had been planning this takeover for over a year, and when they
pounced, a slumbering Standard was caught off guard. As luck would have
it, this shock was ephemeral though, since during November 1999,
Standard was suddenly re-energised and galvanised into action. Their
CEO retired immediately, and was replaced by his deputy. This strategic
leadership change inculcated a new operating culture of urgency and
desperation, and within weeks, a new young and energetic executive
management team was introduced. This team was mandated to produce a
fresh defensive approach, and a sustainable corporate strategy. In
support thereof, they launched the biggest marketing and communications
campaign with the following creed: "simpler, better, faster',.35 This effort
was to consolidate staff and customer support after the gruelling defence
of the Nedcor's takeover bid.
~ A new tactical management team was carefully selected and introduced
for its blend of youthfulness, technical ability, and experience, reflecting an
ethos that recognised intellect, energy, teamwork, and results orientation.
These executives then introduced significant leadership concepts and
energy to critical operating structures of the Bank.
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~ Technical enhancements were effected to their ATM-issued cheques,
which were part of Standard's commitment to reducing cheque fraud. The
tamper-proof cheques were immediately available from more than 400
Auto Plus machines nationally, were printed on watermark paper, and
certified good for 14 days for amounts of up to R5 000 from date of issue.
This execution further reinforced Standard's technological superiority,
which was effectively leveraged off their extensive distribution (branch)
infrastructure.
~ Figure 5.1 below demonstrates this capability, and reflects a comparative
41 % utilisation of Standard bank's electronic banking system.
Figure 5.1: Market share of electronic banking utilisation
Source: BMI Techknowledge
In addition, Standard bank was recognised by many local and overseas
organisations for its ethical and steadfast defence of Nedcor's takeover bid.
Some of these accolades are as follows:
~ PriceWaterHouse Coopers surveyed 30-banks immediately after the
Nedcor takeover bid was rejected by Minister. Among the four leading
South African banks, Standard was voted first in five categories and
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second in seven categories.36 Nedcor was voted top bank in one category
and second best bank in two categories in the same survey.
~ In its inaugural awards for outstanding quality and innovation in Financial
Services around the world, the authoritative British magazine The Banker,
chose Standard bank as its first South African winner. 37 This decision was
based not only on hard statistics, but also on the subjective views of its
global editorial team, and on the findings of questionnaires sent to banks
and other institutions in more than 80- countries. Standard bank's citation
read thus "Standard Bank was named South Africa's Bank of the year for
it's imaginative and constructive defence against rival Nedcor's hostile
take-over bid." The magazine made 71-country, eight regional, six key
investment-banking activities and global custody, and four banking and
technology awards respectively. Furthermore, the Banker reported that
Standard focused on increasing its average return on equity from 18.1 % to
21.8%, while taking action on the technology front, perceived as Nedcor's
main advantage. Standard also took a major step forward in its strategy of
seeking to expand its business in the mass market by setting up a joint
venture with the leading micro-lending organisation in the country (African
Bank Investments), which will lower its credit and operational risk, while
expanding its client reach.
~ Bancassurance, another arm of its activity, the Banker reported, was
boosted through its Liberty Life unit, while Standard Corporate and
Merchant Bank forged ahead. The pinnacle of Standard's post takeover
achievements were articulated by CEO Maree outside Parliament, and
immediately after the merger was turned down. He responded as follows
to a media question: "We really have done so much to develop our
business that I would really think our job over the next two or three years is
around optimising infrastructure, and doing well what is already in place,
as the income streams are there." Both Standard executives and outside
observers noted that the bank seemed re-energised and unified. Several
Standard managers said the bank should "put up a plaque to Nedcor" to
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thank it for Standard's renewed vitality. To confirm this statement,
Standards share price responded positively by moving from R21.50 in May
2000 to R28.00 in August 200029 .
5.6 Recommendations
Ironically and whilst Standard was perceived as a rudderless vessel by the
greater investment community, nothing could have been further from the truth.
Judging by the body of facts, which refuted this controversy during Standards
defence, over and above the subsequent acknowledgements, the following
recommendations as reviewed in this chapter become all the more pertinent.
The competition commission's concerns regarding the proposed merger were
primarily related to retail banking services for individuals and SME's. Within
the wholesale banking sector though, the commission found reasonable
grounds to believe the merger would not substantially prevent or lessen
competition, and so its consequences to retail banking ensured that there was
absolutely no chance of the commission approving the transaction. It is critical
therefore to understand the profile of the adjudication committee, whenever
one is involved in similar circumstances. Moreover, it is of paramount
importance to respect their authority, however questionable it may seem, and
regardless of their official role in the process. This strategy will avoid
cannibalising or alienating a key decision maker, and will increase
sympathetic support from their colleagues in your favour.
5.6.1 Understand your audience profile
It is imperative to balance, understand, and anticipate the idiosyncratic
aspirations of the diverse stakeholders of any organisation. The ability and
foresight to anticipate the requirements and desires of the different
29
Source: JSE daily share price close; Standard archived documents.
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stakeholders under such circumstances is vital. Having achieved that,
institutions must convince their stakeholders to support their economic goals
and objectives. Therefore, well-motivated and considered opinions must be
presented to them, to gain their confidence, and to win as many decision
makers to your position.
5.6.2 Exploit competitor differences
The inherent polarity of diverse decision makers in competitive situations
ought to be recognised early, and appropriate strategies generated to respond
thereto. This may sometimes entail increasing polarity levels, or alternatively,
reduce competitiveness for the actualisation of institutional objectives.
5.6.3 International best practice
Globalisation has rendered international precedents more crucial in arguing
and validating competitive or defensive policies, standards, and conventions.
These benchmarks are becoming all the more acceptable in mediation, and
their influence cannot be over emphasised. Therefore, in similar
circumstances, seek as many comparable incidents, and factor their details in
both offensive and defensive positions. Standard used that offensive tactic to
good effect, and cited the Canadian and Australian precedents extremely well.
This strategy effectively cast doubts on Nedcor's considered underlying
principles.
5.6.4 Consult widely
Nedcor's disregard for the competition commission proved to be an imprudent
manoeuvre. Therefore, always strive to give everyone the benefit of doubt,
and consult extensively wherever possible. It is much easier to be corrected
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during such a process than to be found wanting for errors of commission or
omission, or for simple neglect of a key strategic stakeholder.
5.6.5 Communicate openly
Communicate own intentions in an open and transparent manner. The South
African business conditions have undergone radical transformation. This
scenario demands openness from most quarters, and any communication that
is perceived to be at variance therewith invites needless criticism and
suspicion, effectively compromising the realisation of institutional goals.
5.6.6 Save face
In most if not all interactive endeavours, exercise extreme humility and avoid
aggressive signalling. In Nedcor's disadvantage, their signals were interpreted
as arrogant, demeaning and belligerent. This disposition earned them the
wrath of most regulators who were ultimately going to influence the
adjudication process. Evidently, Nedcor's loss was attributed largely to their
unbecoming behaviour within financial markets, particularly during their
takeover offensive. The merits of their proposal contributed to a lesser extent
to this loss. Therefore, simply respect both the letter and spirit of the law.
In validation thereof, the Chinese have an incisive idiom that visibly explains
this notion. They advise that you should endeavour to save the face of your
opponent. Fight an honest battle, with intent to win gracefully, and always
avoid humiliating or disparaging your opponent, even in defeat. Regrettably,
Standard's management perceived their Nedcor counterparts as disparaging
toward them. This view was informed by remarks made at merger meetings,
which were largely interpreted as personal affronts, and resulted in a
hardening of attitudes. In addition, as the fierceness intensified, Nedcor was
perceived as motivated by power grabbing, and not commercial endeavours.
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This contention was also extended to their principal, Old Mutual and Nedcor's
GEO. Therefore, in any conflict situation, fight honestly and ethically, win or
lose with integrity, and remember that perceptions inform reality. Ethical
behaviour in victory and defeat is a prerequisite for the preservation and
enhancement of institutional integrity. Whilst individuals are expected to fall on
their swords when they have infringed societal norms, institutions rise and fall
on their integrity. Their ethos must be upheld under all circumstances, as any
infringement thereof is frowned upon in the business environment, with fatal
consequences for their future commercial goals.
5.6.7 The Audi Alteram Partem principle
Exercise the "Audi Alteram Partem" principle (hear the other side). This
principle is so poignant in business transactions, as it is often easier to
prescribe a solution, before even understanding the actual problem. In
Nedcor's case, they initiated the merger with a closed mind. In their view,
there was a foregone conclusion that Standard would roll over and allow
Nedcor's hegemony to run roughshod over them. Hence, when Standard
registered their initial rejection to the merger, Nedcor were oblivious thereto
allegedly due to their arrogance, and instead persevered even when the tide
was turning against them. At some stage, even their executives and
organised labour began to secretly question the conventional wisdom of
proceeding with this execution. Unfortunately, their decision makers were
selectively blind and deaf to this reality.
5.6.8 Potential job losses
Nedcor's executive director for human resources did not endear himself to
their detractors either. He infuriated the industry by stating that it was likely to
shed 10000 - 15000 permanent jobs through natural attrition anyway. His
statement implied that job losses that would result from the merger should be
welcomed. He then invited needless attention to Nedcor, and his utterances
were interpreted by both Nedcor and Standard employees, organised labour
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and the government as insensitive to the plight of the unemployed. Organised
labour immediately mobilised its membership and rallied behind Standard's
defence, effectively sending a strong message to both Nedcor and the
regulators of potentially grave consequences should the merger be approved.
Therefore it is important to exercise extreme sensitivity in every company
initiated communication and public pronouncements. These statements could
potentially enhance or inhibit the actualisation of its overall objectives. It is
precisely for this reason that most organisations engage and retain
professional communications specialists, or spin-doctors. This costly but
worthy exercise helps companies avoid unnecessary negative publicity.
5.6.9 Service delivery
Both banks had argued differently on service delivery aspects. Nedcor used
the mega bank ploy and its self-imposed role as the protector of access to
international markets. In addition, they mobilised for the self-sustainability and
global competitiveness of the sector, the benefits of which would ultimately
accrue to the customers. On the other hand, Standard countered that the
merger was a needless and costly experiment, considering that Standard
were already servicing the three different market segments namely, the
personal and SME sector, the commercial and institutional markets
respectively. Given Standard's responsible track record, accumulated
experience, and large capital investments, they were suitably prepared to
enhance their product offering, while supporting their existing competitive
undertakings.
On the governance front, Nedcor's board was inherently weak, as it was
heavily weighted with executive management. Conversely, Standard bank's
board complied with the recommendations of King two's corporate
governance principles. In essence, good governance must be reflected in the
structural organs that represent the company. Having achieved this feat,
industry norms dictate the available competitive advantages to its
096634
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constituents. However, when the company competes in the service industry,
as is the case with Standard and Nedcor, a clearly defined and well-
communicated customer centred strategy, which is supported by an
appropriate infrastructure is key for differentiating innovative industry
leadership positions.
5.6.10 Scorched earth policy
The threatened scorched earth policy from Standard bank's management, and
the globalisation of professionals posed the greatest threats to this merger. As
articulated in all the cases researched by Thomas Peters, the most important
asset in any organisation is its intellectual capital, which resides in its
people. 15 The mass resignation of specialised corporate, investment and
merchant banking teams if it occurred would have destabilised the entire
sector. Competitors were eagerly awaiting the self-destruction of both Nedcor
and Standard, in order to absorb key personnel and clients alike, would have
absorbed most of these skills. Another possible risk was the probability of
these entire teams breaking away and forming competitive niche banks or
advisory services, and in return contracting their services to the merged
group, which would have no option but to comply. In the final analysis, the
mooted cost savings would be negated by the contractual obligations arising
from this arrangement.
Finally, the likelihood of losing these skills to international markets was a
possible reality. These are some of the disadvantages of knowledge
economies and virtual industries such as banking, where competent
professionals are exposed to boundless networking opportunities at the local,
regional and international levels. Therefore these professionals can ply their
trade anywhere in the world, and countenance attractive occupational
alternatives daily. Standard argued therefore that it was imperative for its
officials to be integrally embedded in the overall strategic business plans so
as to create an enabling and satisfactory operating context. Similarly, there
are alternative strategies for offensive or defensive approaches. They are
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sometimes referred to as go or no go strategies, and are discernible as
follows.
5.7 Recommended ddefensive strategies for competing in maturing
industries16
There are numerous defensive options that are open to in these situations, the
mostly considered being the following for their generic use and significant
success:
~ Emphasise value chain innovation and quality outcomes.
~ Maximise the efforts to reinvent industry value chains, which can have four
fold payoffs, which are:
o Lower costs
o Better products or services
o Greater capability to turn multiple or customised versions
o Shorter designs to market cycles
5.7.1 Increase sales to present customers
This is the most appealing strategy, and certainly the most cost effective,
given that the customers are already familiar with the products and services of
the seller. It is simpler to convince them to move from being single product
consumers to multiple portfolio customers.
5.7.2 Purchase rivals at bargain basement prices




All four first tier banks attempted this strategy particularly within the SADC
region, albeit at different focus areas. This expansion was bold, and derived
profitable outcomes for the incumbents. On the other hand, Standard's
differentiated strategies effectively produced its competitive edge through the
deployment of creative and innovative teams, particularly at the wholesale
sector.
5.7.4 Consider joint ventures or alliances
Furthermore, Standard's strategic alliance with African bank was efficiently
executed to enhance its presence in the mass-market segment. Standard had
concluded long ago that simultaneously running both races was effective in
more diverse and expansive skills, thereby stretching resources and
competitive capabilities than they can manage alone. Hence this competitive
attraction of alliances enabled Standard to bundle competencies and
resources that are more valuable n a joint effort than when kept separate.
5.7.5 To compete or not compete9
Once the decision to grow is made, how does one go about executing the
strategy? Most experts of competitive tactics preach the concept of attacking
a competitor's weaknesses, and some have been wrong. Therefore General
Patton's strategy shows promise in this regard, and is quoted thus: "I have
studied the enemy all my life. I have read the memoirs of his generals and
leaders. I have even read his philosophers and listened to his music. I have
studied in detail the account of every damned one of his battles. I know
exactly how he'll react under any given set of circumstances. And he hasn't
the slightest idea what I'm going to do. So when the time comes, I'm going to
105
whip the hell out of him3o. He then suggested the following competitive rules,
that he claims will produce better results against your competitors.
5.7.5.1 Control the "Sandbox"
The mark of a successful strategy is that it allows you to control, or at least
influence, the terms of play in the "competitive sandbox." If you are not
controlling or at least influencing the conditions of play in the competitive
arena you have proactively chosen, your strategy is not working! Change it
quickly rather than suffer a long, painful death.
5.7.5.2 Identify which competitors your strategy will attract
Once your strategy has been developed, look around to see which
organisation will be attracted to it. If your strategy represents a change from
the one you pursued in the past, the competitors it will attract will not be the
same as the previous ones. Once you understand your strategy, and the
sandbox you will be in, new potential competitors can easily be identified.
5.7.5.3 Anticipate each potential competitor's future strategy
The next step is to anticipate each competitor's driving force and business
concept. At this point, some might say that this cannot be done because we
do not sit on our competitor's strategy sessions. However, the strategy of any
company ends up translating itself into physical evidence such as products,
geographic markets, customers, buildings, technologies, facilities, people,
skills, and so forth.
By looking at the actions of a competitor in these areas, one can identify what
has driven the competitor to do what he has done. In other words, identify
what was the driving force behind that competitor's strategy. In the same
30
Michel Robert; Page 88; Strategy pure and simple.
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manner, by looking at a competitor's current actions, announced actions, or
anticipated actions, one can identify the strategic heartbeat of that competitors
business. This can be done for each competitor that you think your strategy
will attract.
5.7.5.4 Draw competitive profiles
You can now anticipate where each competitor will put its emphasis and de-
emphasis in terms of products, users, and geographic markets. Therefore,
you can now draw "pictures" of what each competitor will look like from the
pursuit of such a strategy. One misconception exists however, about
competitive behaviour. Many people assume that all competitors in one
industry behave the same way. Not necessarily so. Usually, each
competitor's strategic heartbeat is different, so each competitor will act
differently under a similar set of circumstances.
However, if you detect what is at the root of a competitor's strategy, you can
anticipate the various behaviours and put into place a different set of actions
to deal with each competitor. For example, although Toyota and Honda are
both in the motor vehicle industry, each will react very differently under a
similar set of circumstances, because each is pursuing a strategy that has a
different driving force at its root. Toyota wants to become "the world's largest
car company"; whereas Honda's driving force is it's engine technology. It is in
the car business only because of Mr Honda's concept of producing "engines
for the world."
5.7.5.5 Manage the competitor's strategy
Not so long ago, we had the opportunity to work with one of the best-known
manufacturers of buses. When we arrived, one competitor was identified as
pursuing a "copycat" strategy. In other words, whatever bus contract our
client bid on, as few weeks later its competitor would enter a similar but lower-
price bid. If our client chose not to bid, neither would the competitor. The
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pattern repeated itself all over the world. Once the competitor's strategy was
recognised, a plan was developed to "manage" that strategy. A very large
project emerged in Asia involving some 4000 buses. Because of a previous
bad experience in that part of the world, our client did not want the project.
However, to lure the competitor, the company put in a bid that included more
services than required and at a price well below cost. Sure enough, the
competitor submitted a bid and was awarded the contract. Two-thirds of the
way into the project, the competitor ran into major cost overruns to the extent
that the company announced it was looking for a merger partner to help it out
of financial difficulties. A little later, our client bought out its competitor for a
song, took over its market, and eliminated it from others. All actions were put
into place two years before!
If one wants to identify a competitor's strategy, one needs to understand two
elements about that competitor. These two elements are the competitor's
driving force (strategic heartbeat), and the business concept that the
competitor is practising in that mode.
5.7.5.6 Neutralise the competitor's areas of excellence
A proactive strategy is one that allows you to control or influence the rules of
play in the competitive sandbox. Some experts will tell you that the way to do
this is to analyse each competitor's strengths and weaknesses and then to
exploit those weaknesses. Time and again, this was not appealing, as many
corporate leaders were not interested in spending money to strengthen
competitors. Attacking a competitor's weakness makes the competitor a long-
term advantage. You now need to attack another weakness and the whole
cycle starts over. If you carry this scenario to its logical but somewhat absurd
end, eventually you will have strengthened your competitor so much that it
might put you out of business.
A better way of dealing with competitors is to anticipate each competitor's
strategy and then manage that strategy, which will put you in a stronger
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competitive position. This as mentioned earlier, is not achieved by attacking a
competitor's weakness or by attacking the driving force of the competitor's
strategy, and accompanying areas of excellence.
5.7.5.7 Choose your competitors: Do not let them choose you
To be proactive, each company must consciously choose in which competitive
arena, or "sandbox" it wants to be. The first step is to delimit the sandbox.
You can make the sandbox as large or as small as you want. In order to
"control" the sandbox and the terms of play, two decisions must be made.
The first is to choose which competitor to invite into the sandbox, because you
are confident that you can attack that competitor's strategic heartbeat and
areas of excellence. Against this competitor, you now want to devise
"offensive" tactics to accomplish this objective. The second class of
competitors to include in your sandbox are those that are in a position of
attacking your areas of excellence. You will want to monitor these
competitors very carefully because they could give your strategy difficulty.
The rest of the competitors are probably not in a position to do much damage.
If you do not disturb them, they will probably not disturb you. If any attack
you, they will probably attack your weaknesses and only make you better.
Therefore, one should practice the concept of single target competition. In
other words, go after one competitor at a time. We all know what happens to
someone who starts a war on two fronts.
5.7.5.8 Changing the rules of play
A Chinese General, Sun Tzu, wrote in the fourth century "what is of supreme
importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. And the best way to
neutralise a competitor's strategic heartbeat, in our view, is to change the
rules of play.
5.8. Summary: Chapter 5
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Seemingly both institutions had discounted the verdict judging by their muted
responses. Standard sighed a big relief, because they were geared for a
lengthy high court battle. Their legal team had prepared all the necessary
court documents, which were ready for signature and lodgement with the
respective juridical authorities. On the other hand, Nedcor accepted the
judgement, and stated that they will continue to pursue their inorganic growth
strategy, and mutually beneficial technology partnerships. They further stated
that they were poised to become a diversified information processing
specialist company, and thus will improve their technological expertise and
offering, which they will on-sell to whichever corporate desired these services.
However, Nedcor's failure to constructively engage with the Competition
Commission was reviewed in this chapter, which strategic blunder proved to
be the forerunner which undermined Nedcor's efforts, an oversight which
emerged repeatedly, and haunted Nedcor's negotiators due to their failure to
provide substantive arguments that could have influenced the Commissions'
opinions otherwise. Because of this information gap, the commission relied
solely on Standard's comprehensive submissions in their analysis of both
arguments, and instead, Nedcor was chastised for their perceived fleecing
service charges and fee structures. Their subsequent loss of 800,000
customers was attributed to their relatively high pricing strategy, which
weakness was opportune for Standard bank, and they used it to launch their
successful defensive programme.
An almost clinical strategic textbook theory, executed with committed
precision ensued. It started with executive and operational management
changes, where new leadership blood was introduced, thus reinforcing the
strategic leadership structures. This was followed by technological
enhancements, new product innovations and introductions, and underpinned
by the launch of a new marketing and communications campaign. In return,
Standard was rewarded by numerous organisations for their robust defence of
the merger, and sustainable strategic framework.
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They were showered with prestigious local and international accolades, in
recognition of this almost impossible feat, which in most sectors was a
foregone conclusion that they were going to be acquired. In conclusion,
certain recommendations were advanced which represent lessons learnt and
pitfalls to be avoided in similar circumstances. These are generic
recommendations that would apply whether one is an aggressor or defender
of unsolicited merger proposals. In the next chapter, I will deal specifically with






This chapter contains the consolidated summary of the entire research study.
The research purpose was to examine the objectives of the proposed merger,
and respond to Nedcor's motivations for pursuing this amalgamation at all
costs. Their disregard for the ensuing squander of significant and valuable
resources in what was regarded as a futile takeover effort, which precipitated
a fierce and profitless battle for industry domination invited this scrutiny.
Therefore, as already discussed in the previous chapters, Nedcor announced
their proposed offer to acquire Standard bank on 15 November 1999 by
offering one Nedcor share for 5,5 Standard bank shares. During this time, and
largely due to the efficient information flows within this sector, there was a
foregone conclusion that Standard was going to be acquired by Nedcor. This
view was reinforced by primary research studies, which originated from the
investment analyst community.
The comparative resource strengths of both competitors were presented in
table 1.2, and further examined in the SWOT analysis and in subsequent
chapters. Their contents clearly demonstrated the capacity differences of both
banks. Standard's comparative superiority was undoubted, which begged the
question, did Nedcor expect a stronger company to simply submit to be
acquired by a comparatively weaker competitor? It goes without saying
therefore that no financially sustainable and successful company would
accept the conditions proposed by Nedcor, unless its future viability was in
question. Standard's response is thus viewed in this context, and can be
justified in its fight to the bitter end to avert what it perceived as an attempted
hostile takeover.
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At the time, Standard was regarded as a rudderless vessel that was plagued
by management ineptitude. This perception was evident in a myriad of bad
commercial decisions that culminated in significant financial losses. These
execution flaws thus signalled to Nedcor that it was opportune to launch their
offensive. After making their initial offer, Nedcor then argued that their primary
motivation for the merger was to protect and preserve the banking sector's
integrity, considering that Standard had lost its strategic focus.
Standard bank's failure was thus imminent. Therefore, negative
consequences of this failure were too ghastly to contemplate for the industry,
and hence Nedcor deemed it appropriate to intervene for the benefit of
national pride, and for the South African economy at large. In essence,
Nedcor's attempt to combine its banking operations with those of Standard
could potentially unlock significant strategic value, and thus enable the
merged entity to undertake mega projects that the prior independent
companies could not even contemplate. Moreover, the merged entity would
acquire cutting edge technologies, superior competitive capabilities, an
innovative product portfolio, and a stronger balance sheet. Consequently,
economies of scale and scope would emerge, the optimisation of which would
present other opportunities for leveraging off this capacity.
Nedcor also argued strongly in favour of related diversification as both an
offensive and defensive strategic option, whose combined value chain could
potentially resonate throughout the new banking group. This was so, due to
the rapid globalisation of nations, which presented endless business
opportunities and alternatives. The financial sustainability of households and
corporations alike continued to be tested. Hence, single product focussed
companies found it increasingly difficult to maintain their relevance.
Standard bank was not convinced though, and suspected that Nedcor and its
principal Old Mutual were motivated by factors beyond those stated in the
merger proposals. Standard reasoned quite eloquently on a range of strategic
issues, and effectively argued about the absence of a strategic fit between the
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two banks, which approach ultimately swung the decision in their favour. The
strategic divergence of both institutions was confirmed in paragraph 1.2.4, and
equally frustrated the successful conclusion of this merger. On second
thoughts however, the same strategic reasons that were advanced about the
lack of strategic convergence were conversely strong points in favour of the
merger concept. These strategic differences would have enabled the merged
entity to specialise and compete efficiently in different niche markets, while
sharing a rationalised back office and tactical support infrastructure. This
approach would have presented the merged company with exceptional
competitive prospects, and comparatively low input costs, whilst also creating
sufficient space for their present management structures to continue without
interfering in each other's affairs. This observation supports the suggestion
made by Dr. Abedian regarding the potential success of the merged entity as
discussed in chapter four.
Interestingly though, Standard's arguments concerning the poor historical
record of South African banking mergers did not hold either, because history
informs the future, and has been known to repeat itself, but the past cannot
predict the future. Emergent and modern leadership philosophies and
forecasting techniques would have confirmed this hypothesis. So, visionary
leadership would have been deployed successfully to mitigate against these
systemic risks that were given prominence in Standard's defence.
Nevertheless, Standard was dogmatic and clearly articulated their fierce
opposition to this potential takeover. They even threatened serious retaliation,
but Nedcor demonstrated its resilience, leading to fierce competitive rivalry.
The real potential for a scorched earth policy was thus imminent, as
Standard's management threatened to walk out en masse, which Nedcor
simply disregarded as mere posturing. This attitude further reinforced the
prevailing notion of Nedcor's arrogance and overconfidence.
After examining Standard bank's strategic focus, and contrary to popular lore,
it was understandable that Standard had in fact developed and was executing
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cohesive and sustainable commercial goals. However, their business case
and strategy execution were poorly communicated to their stakeholders, as
already discussed and efficiently exploited by Nedcor. To reiterate,
Standard's objectives were to:
~ Maintain a 20+% growth target through strategic and business
diversification.
~ Reduce their cost to income ratio, grow revenue, and segment the market
accordingly.
~ Establish a niche investment banking operation in London, and specialise
in trading financial instruments from emerging markets.
~ Expand into the rest of Africa.
~ Seek out South Africa's low-income groups, and provide relevant financial
and banking products and services that are appropriate for their specific
requirements.
After a thorough analysis of their objectives, and having extracted the
essential evidence to substantiate the robustness of Standard bank's strategy
executions, Nedcor's motivation for the merger became clearer. By using the
balanced scorecard measurement system, this evaluation confirmed that not
only did Standard bank achieve all these objectives, they actually surpassed
most as discussed in paragraph 4.5 earlier.
6.2 The Old Mutual equation
At the time of this conflict, rumours permeated the financial industry that
Nedcor's CEO was a candidate to replace Old Mutual's incumbent. With
hindsight, this allegation confirmed Old Mutual's eagerness to sustain the
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merger, regardless of the consequences. Old Mutual obviously stood to
benefit from the merger in several ways, including the rationalisation of their
banking holdings. It also transpired that both Standard bank and Liberty Life's
strategic alliance was a major competitive threat to Old Mutual's future
ambitions. In 1999, Old Mutual was listed on the London Stock Exchange. It
held 54% in Nedcor, and 23% shares in Standard. Most of Old Mutual's stake
in Standard was held on behalf of Old Mutual's policyholders, while its Nedcor
shares were in shareholders funds. According to English company law, any
shareholding above 20% was regarded as a controlling stake. So here was a
life insurance company holding controlling interests in two competing banks, a
situation that caused raised eyebrows within London's financial markets. The
same markets now suspected that the incentive for Old Mutual to force this
Standard-Nedcor merger at the expense of Standard were the secondary
benefits that would flow directly to Old Mutual's shareholders.4o
Another flaw in this saga was that contrary to good corporate governance,
Nedcor's board consisted largely of Nedcor management. There was no
strong outside voice of reason to mediate or modify their strategic approach,
particularly during the merger. This observation thus explains their
intransigence to pursue this merger to its logical conclusion, even when the
odds were evidently against them.
Therefore, had this merger been successful, Old Mutual would have probably
removed the merged bank from its consolidated balance sheet, because it
would thus own less than 50% thereof. Old Mutual would then be in a better
position to define itself as an international asset management company, rather
than a holding company of South African banks. Paradoxically, one of its
biggest competitors was Standard bank owned Liberty Life, whose fate it
would have eventually controlled.
Against this background, one can safely conclude that Standard's defensive
strategy was indeed successful. Standard bank surpassed all the yardsticks
that were set for its objectives, which included the successful defence of
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Nedcor's hostile takeover. Furthermore, these efforts were recognised and
rewarded by numerous organisations both domestic and international, which
bestowed coveted accolades in recognition of Standard bank's efficient
strategy execution in fighting off the proposed merger.
6.3 Conclusion
Why did Nedcor decide to merge with Standard bank? This question was
answered by analysing industry characteristics. The discussions referred to
the financial sector as having exhibited most if not all attributes of a maturing
industry. Nedcor then elected to exercise its first mover offensive because
mergers and acquisitions are another attractive strategy for strengthening a
firm's competitiveness. They allow a company to fill resource gaps or correct
competitive deficiencies, as combining operations can result in lower costs,
stronger technological skills, more or better competitive capabilities and
capacity to expand into new areas. Similarly, they had considered vertical
integration, as vertical integration makes sense if it strengthens a company's
position via cost reductions, or the creation of differentiation based advantage.
This strategy was consistent with Nedcor's strategic intent, which was market
domination of a particular niche, by becoming the industry's lowest cost
producer. Therefore, when Nedcor chose to launch its offensive strategic
move to secure its competitive advantage, they deliberately aimed at
Standard bank's competitive weakness. This aggressive pre-emptive strike
caught Standard bank napping, with Nedcor exploiting its first mover
advantage, an area in which Nedcor was sufficiently skilled, and where they
demonstrated better structural and executional cost drivers.
However, when Standard bank recovered from the initial takeover shock, they
usually mobilised their defensive resources and proceeded to place effective
obstacles in Nedcor's, and thus fortified their present position. Nedcor was
given strong signals that the resulting battle will be more costly, and Standard
bank implemented defensive actions that foreclosed on Nedcor's options for
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initiating competitive attacks. Through effective signalling and publicly
announcing their pending management changes, Standard committed to
maintain their market share, organically grow their business, launch new ATM
technological products, a new advertising campaign, and publicly announced
to defend this merger in the courts. If all else failed, they threatened unleash
their scorched earth policy of mass management walkouts. This defensive line
of attack was consistent with Standard bank's strategic intent, namely
industry leadership on a national and global basis.
Standard went on and changed their CEO, and introduced a new cadre of
strategic managers, who were talented, young, and energetic, and proceeded
to turn the strategies and company focus around. Not only was this execution
effective, it protected the status quo, buttressed Standard's present
competitive position, bought Standard precious time to adjust its strategic
defences to changing industry conditions thus blocking Nedcor's aggressive
first mover advantage. Furthermore, all the abovementioned signals were also
actualised. Standard bank therefore set the scene for an integrated approach
to mergers and acquisitions within the financial sector, but also across
sectors, which will present a good learning case in the future for effective
strategy setting and execution.
One of the fundamental doctrines of contributing to a sustainable financial
sector is to achieve continuous improvements by ensuring the provision of
basic financial services. They must achieve:
1. Sustainable and affordable banking services.
2. Contractual savings schemes.
3. Provide credit for small and micro enterprises.
4. Sophisticated and cutting edge banking technological systems for
commercial and institutional markets.
5. Support the establishment of third tier community based financial
organisations, or alternative financial institutions, and develops sustainable
institutions to serve poor communities.
118
The financial sector's regulators, who then achieve these obligations through
the establishment of an enabling regulatory environment and architecture of
the financial sector, must actualise these objectives. This infrastructure is
expected to promote the lowering of barriers to entry, whilst facilitating healthy
competition. Relevant aspects of the regulatory environment include, but are
not limited to the national payments system, deposit-taking rules, licensing
requirements, corporate governance practices, disclosure practices, the
Pension Funds Act, and prudential investment guidelines. On the other hand,
competition law, some aspects of the Companies Act, and the residual pool of
intellectual capital must be improved by focusing on attracting new entrants,
continually investing in the skills development of existing and a new
professional and management cadre.
However, disparities of the South African workplace resulting from past
discriminatory practices and laws were not only unjust, but also had direct
negative implications for economic efficiency, competitiveness, and
productivity. In addition, the South African education system and the labour
market did not produce an adequate number of qualified professionals, with
the relevant skills required by the financial sector.
Finally, the underlying reasons for the revolution that succeeded a
conventional merger proposal, which then degenerated into a hostile takeover
bid, were examined. Evidently, the two banks were not diametrically opposed
to an amalgamation. In fact, they both agreed on the strategic importance and
business wisdom thereof. The fundamental differences arose from Standard's
perception of Nedcor's deep-rooted arrogant intents, which were to gain its
assets at bargain basement prices. These views were extended to Nedcor's
principal Old Mutual as well, who were accused of harbouring sinister designs
to actualise the obsessions of Nedcor's CEO, who sought to preside over the
largest bank in the country, if not in the sub-continent.
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In the final analysis, a significant fortune and precious time were wasted in
waging and defending a fruitless effort. This culminated in enriching the
consultants and professional advisors alike, at the expense of both Standard
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